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1.1 Background   
During the last decades, the world has regularly faced major crises in the field of livestock 
production and food safety. Examples include Classical Swine Fever (CSF) during the 1990s 
in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the 
1990s in the United Kingdom, recent Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in China, 
and Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and South Korea in 2001 and 
2010 respectively. Such crises not only caused enormous socio-economic impacts (e.g., 
Meuwissen et al., 1999; Saatkamp et al., 2000; Anonymous, 2002; Mangen, 2002; Asseldonk 
et al., 2005), they resulted also in reduced public confidence in food production and products 
(Jonge et al., 2004).  
 
The EU responded by new standards (e.g. introducing the new hygiene rules for foodstuffs, 
food of animal origin, etc.), the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
in 2002 and the subsequent establishment of Food Safety Authorities (FSAs) in individual 
member states (e.g. the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) founded 
in 2002). FSAs can be described as ‘a body to coordinate and direct scientific research, risk 
analysis, monitoring and inspections and to communicate to the public on matters of food 
safety to restore consumer confidence in the safety of food’ (Wit, 2003). Its mission is to 
provide scientific advice, technical support, risk assessment, monitoring, risk communication 
and collaboration with national actors (EFSA, 2008). One of the main activities of FSAs is 
surveillance to guarantee food safety in livestock production chains, ranging from visual 
inspection and blood sampling to second-line supervision (e.g. auditing) of surveillance by 
others (e.g. slaughterhouses). The aim of these surveillance activities is to provide 
information on livestock hazards to help decision makers make intervention strategies. Since 
the financial resource available to support governmental veterinary services become more and 
more limited (Stärk et al., 2006), increasing demands are posed on FSAs to improve the cost-
effectiveness of their livestock hazard surveillance activities (FAO, 2006).  
 
Surveillance in livestock production chains is highly essential for food producers (i.e. farmers) 
and food companies because it has major implications on their interests. As a result, both 
farmers and food companies pay more and more attention to livestock hazard surveillance to 
ensure livestock product’s safety. In the Netherlands, a national animal health fund was 
created in the mid-1990s and funds disease surveillance and monitoring in peace time. The 
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contribution to this fund is totally from farmers, because policy makers believed that disease 
control (including surveillance) is an integral part of livestock production, and that hence the 
costs should be borne by farmers (Anonymous, 2008). Hence, it is self-evident that Dutch 
farmers are a major stakeholder for livestock hazard surveillance. Food companies put many 
resources in carrying out surveillance activities along their food supply chains and in 
conducting research to improve their current surveillance practice. Hence, food companies 
also have big interests in livestock hazard surveillance, and are therefore also a stakeholder.  
 
Livestock hazard surveillance has become a more important topic in the scientific literature in 
the last decades, because more and more researchers have realized the importance of 
surveillance from both the theoretical and practical point of view. A large amount of research 
has been conducted for case studies (e.g., David et al., 2011; Kuiken et al., 2011; Pultorak et 
al., 2011; Robertson, et al., 2011) with regard to surveillance in livestock production chains, 
and only  a few researchers have been engaged in conceptual development (e.g., Drewe et al., 
2013; Hoinville et al., 2013; Häsler, 2011). Therefore, the scientific community is an 
important group of participants who have strong voices on livestock hazard surveillance.    
 
Hence, surveillance in livestock production chains is an important managerial issue in many 
dimensions, and research to address this issue is relevant for various groups of stakeholders.    
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Any surveillance organization, such as FSAs and food companies, has limited financial 
resources to conduct livestock hazard surveillance and is facing the challenge to maximize the 
surveillance performance under financial resource constraints, or alternatively, to minimize 
surveillance costs while guaranteeing a maximum surveillance performance. Although 
extensive research has been conducted to achieve surveillance optimization in livestock 
production chains, they overlooked aspects in terms of theoretical completeness (i.e. a 
standard complete framework to address the problem) and operational appropriateness 
(standard modelling approach to mimic the real-world behavior).  
 
Existing research mainly addresses the problem from a technical point of view, i.e. by 
focusing on the technical performance of surveillance (e.g. Willeberg et al., 2011; Bruhn et al., 
2014; Stevens and Pfeiffer, 2014). Economic aspects of livestock hazard surveillance have 
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been ignored in most previous surveillance studies (Drewe et al., 2012). Although having 
been overlooked for a long period, the importance of including economic aspects into 
livestock hazard surveillance evaluation has been increasingly stressed by the scientific 
community. As a result, research considering the economic dimensions of surveillance is 
increasingly observed in the literature. For example, Klinkenberg et al. (2005) investigated 
the cost-effectiveness of the current Dutch CSF surveillance system using Monte Carlo 
simulation. Prattley et al. (2007) evaluated the cost-effectiveness of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance. Hadorn et al. (2009) carried out a cost-effectiveness 
evaluation of bluetongue surveillance in Switzerland using scenario tree modelling. Häsler et 
al. (2012) conducted an economic evaluation of the surveillance and intervention program for 
bluetongue virus serotype 8 in Switzerland. Although such works included the economic 
aspects into their analyses, they mainly addressed the surveillance costs and avoided financial 
losses and ignored the non-financial mitigated impacts attributable to surveillance, e.g., 
avoided human health problems, animal welfare losses, and animal owners’ psychological 
pressure (Hoinville et al., 2013). In addition, the asymmetrical allocations of surveillance 
costs and benefits to various stakeholders also have economic implications. For example, 
farmers bear largely the surveillance costs, while the benefits also accrue to other stakeholders 
such as processors, retailors, and consumers. Therefore, a successful approach for economic 
evaluation of surveillance needs to incorporate various stakeholders’ preferences (to the 
benefits and costs of surveillance) into the analysis, which has not yet been studied by 
previous works in this area.  
 
Moreover, some researchers have realized that the economics of livestock hazard surveillance 
not only depends on surveillance itself but also on intervention. Hence, they have conducted 
research to address the relationship between surveillance and intervention for economic 
analysis. Häsler et al., (2011) developed a conceptual framework for economic analysis by 
conceptualizing the relationship between disease surveillance, intervention and mitigation. 
Howe et al. (2013) further developed the theoretical foundation of this relationship. The 
essence of these works is that the mitigated losses from a livestock hazard rely on the quality 
of both surveillance and intervention. Without effective intervention programmes, even the 
best surveillance systems can not protect against major losses caused by the hazard. The focus 
of this dissertation is merely on the surveillance part, because I want to compare the economic 
efficiency of different surveillance programmes only. To serve this purpose, I assume a fixed 
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intervention strategy (e.g., taking the default intervention strategy as given). By doing so, all 
differences in costs and benefits are attributable to the surveillance programmes. A more 
comprehensive economic analysis of the joint effect of surveillance and intervention could 
yield different outcomes, but such an analysis would significantly increase the complexity of 
the research.  
   
Yet another major limitation of existing research is that it analyses livestock hazard 
surveillance at a relatively aggregated level (e.g., Crauwels et al., 1999; Elbers et al., 2002). 
An appropriate analytical method or model should take into account the individual-level 
details in hazard dynamics (e.g. the development of hazard related symptoms, the 
transmission mechanism for the hazard, etc.) and surveillance setup (including various 
surveillance activities). What is most essential is it should successfully mimic the interactions 
between the detailed hazard dynamics within the animal population and the surveillance setup 
and derive the corresponding surveillance performance and costs. However, such an approach 
is not observed yet in the literature.           
 
1.3 Objective  
The overall research objective of this dissertation is to improve understanding of livestock 
hazard surveillance to achieve economic optimization, i.e., either increasing the surveillance 
performance with a limited budget or decreasing surveillance costs but still maintaining 
certain level of surveillance performance. In the conceptual dimension, it aims to obtain 
knowledge on economic implications of surveillance in livestock production chains, including 
the costs and benefits from conducting surveillance activities as well as the valuations of 
those costs and benefits by stakeholders. In the application dimension, it is to apply the 
obtained knowledge to address the financial resource allocation problem for livestock hazard 
surveillance to help surveillance organizations increase the efficiency of their surveillance 
activities. To realize the overall objective, four sub-objectives are proposed: 
- To improve the scientific understanding of the livestock-hazard surveillance decision-
making process by developing a standard conceptual framework for single-hazard 
surveillance system analysis;  
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- To improve the scientific understanding of the livestock-hazard surveillance decision-
making process for surveillance portfolios by developing a conceptual framework for 
surveillance-portfolio analysis;  
- To test the developed conceptual frameworks by applying the concepts to concrete case 
studies; 
- To derive the practical results that can help the surveillance decision makers to improve 
their surveillance practice by applying the concepts to concrete case studies.  
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of six chapters: a general introduction (Chapter 1), four research 
chapters (Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5) and a general discussion (Chapter 6). An outline of the thesis 
structure is presented in Figure 1.1.  
General Introduction
(Chapter 1) 
Single hazard surveillance 
analysis framework 
(Chapter 2)
Surveillance portfolio 
optimization framework
(Chapter 3)
Case study using the single 
hazard surveillance analysis 
framework
(Chapter 4)
Case study using the surveillance 
portfolio optimization framework
(Chapter 5)
General Discussion 
(Chapter 6) 
 
Figure 1.1 The outline of the dissertation  
 
12 
 
Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework for the economic analysis of single-hazard 
surveillance systems in livestock production chains which differs from most of the previous 
research focusing on the technical aspect of livestock hazard surveillance (e.g., Ward et al., 
1996; Bouma, et al., 2001; Paisley et al., 2011). This single-hazard analysis conceptual 
framework includes objective and subjective aspects of single-hazard surveillance system 
analysis considering the principles described by Häsler (2011) and Häsler et al. (2011). The 
objective analysis is a simulation model aimed at deriving an efficient set of surveillance 
setups based on the technical surveillance performance parameters and the corresponding 
surveillance costs, and the subjective analysis is a multi-criteria decision making model to 
evaluate the impacts of the hazard surveillance. This chapter also discusses the scientific 
validity of the conceptual framework and the availability of data in the framework’s 
application.     
 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework for the economic optimization of a surveillance- 
portfolio consisting of multiple livestock hazards to survey. This framework applies the 
portfolio perspective to investigate the surveillance resource allocation problem, which is 
beyond the state of art that mainly focuses on single hazard surveillance analyses (e.g. Feld et 
al., 2000; Raulo and Lyytikainen, 2007; Martinez et al., 2011; Todd and Notermans, 2011; 
Chan et al., 2013; Dürr et al., 2013). A multi-criteria surveillance-portfolio optimization 
model is proposed which uses the outputs of the single hazard surveillance analysis as inputs. 
This chapter also discusses the scientific validity and data validity of the conceptual approach. 
The practical use of the conceptual approach is also discussed.        
 
Chapter 4 applies the single-hazard surveillance framework to conduct a comprehensive 
economic analysis of CSF surveillance in the Netherlands. It takes into account the 
specialized structure of Dutch pig production, differences in virulence of CSF strains, and a 
complete list of possible surveillance activities. This chapter uses the current Dutch CSF 
surveillance system (i.e. the default surveillance setup) as the starting point, and investigates a 
number of alternative surveillance setups through cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses. 
Managerial insights are obtained to facilitate the decision making of the policy makers.       
 
Chapter 5 applies the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework to conduct economic 
optimization of a pig-hazard surveillance-portfolio, consisting of five pig-related hazards, in a 
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Dutch food company. In this chapter, each hazard is first analyzed by the single hazard 
surveillance analysis model to derive the technical surveillance performances and annual 
surveillance costs for each investigated surveillance setup. Then, the impact parameters 
corresponding to certain technical surveillance performance are estimated by relevant hazard 
experts. Together with the elicited stakeholder’s weights, the surveillance portfolio 
optimization model is parameterized. Managerial implications are derived from the model’s 
results to help the company improve its surveillance portfolio’s performance.      
 
Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of different chapters and also with the existing literature. It 
also discusses the implications for future research and the efforts required for further 
implementing the conceptual frameworks for single hazard surveillance and surveillance 
portfolio optimization. This chapter ends up with a summary of the main conclusions drawn 
from this PhD dissertation.    
 
Reference 
Anonymous, 2002. The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease. Report by the comptroller 
and auditor general HC 939 session 2001-2002, London, UK, 133. Available from: 
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2002/06/0102939es.pdf 
Anonymous, 2008. Disease cost-sharing overseas - how other countries do it. Available from:  
http://www.fwi.co.uk/articles/22/08/2008/111751/disease-cost-sharing-overseas-how-
other-countries-do.htm 
Asseldonk, M.V., de Jong, M., de Vlieger, K., Huirne, R., 2005. Prevention and control of 
foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever and avian influenza in the European 
Union: an integrated analysis of epidemiological, economic, and social-ethical aspects. 
Wageningen University and Research Center. Available from:   
http://edepot.wur.nl/121049 
Bouma, A., Stegeman, J.A., Engel, B., de Kluijver, E.P., Elbers, A.R.W., De Jong, M.C.M., 
2001. Evaluation of diagnostic tests for the detection of classical swine fever in the 
field without a gold standard. The Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation 13, 
383-388. 
Bruhn, S., Engels, M., Thomas, Y., Peter-Egli, J., Born R., 2014. Monitoring of influenza 
virus in pigs and humans in Switzerland. Proceeding ICAHS2 2nd International 
Conference on Animal Health Surveillance Palacio de las Convenciones, The Havana, 
14 
 
Cuba, 7-9 May 2014.   
Chan, G.K., Zhu, K.Y., Chou, D.J., Guo, A.J., Dong, T.T., Tsim, K.W., 2013. Surveillance of 
nitrite level in cubilose: Evaluation of removal method and proposed origin of 
contamination. Food Control 34, 637-644. 
Crauwels, A.P.P., Nielen, M., Stegeman, J.A., Elbers, A.R.W., Dijkhuizen, A.A., Tielen, 
M.J.M., 1999: The effectiveness of routine serological surveillance : case study of the 
1997 epidemic of classical swine fever in the Netherlands. Revue scientifique et 
technique 18, 627-637. 
David, J.M., Danan, C., Chauvin, C., Chazel, M., Souillard, R., Brisabois, A., Weill, F.X., 
Jourdan-Da Silva, N., Picherot, M., Guillemot, D., Sanders, P., 2011. Structure of the 
French farm-to-table surveillance system for Salmonella. Revue de Médecine 
Vétérinaire 162, 489-500. 
Drewe, J.A., Hoinville, L.J., Cook, A.J.C., Floyd, T., Stark, K.D.C., 2012. Evaluation of 
animal and public health surveillance systems: a systematic review. Epidemiology & 
Infection 140, 575-590. 
Drewe, J., Hoinville, L., Cook, A., Floyd, T., Gunn, G., Stärk, K., 2013. SERVAL: a new 
framework for the evaluation of animal health surveillance. Transboundary and 
emerging diseases. 
Dürr, S., zu Dohna, H., Di Labio, E., Carpenter, T.E., Doherr, M.G., 2013: Evaluation of 
control and surveillance strategies for classical swine fever using a simulation model. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 108, 73-84. 
EC, 2000. The White Paper on Food Safety. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub06_en.pdf 
EC, 2007. The White Paper on Food Safety. Available from:   
http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/documents/nutrition_w
p_en.pdf 
EFSA, 2008. Annual Report 2008. Available from: 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/corporate/pub/ar08.htm 
Elbers, A.R.W., Bouma, A., Stegeman, J.A., 2002: Quantitative assessment of clinical signs 
for the detection of classical swine fever outbreaks during an epidemic. Veterinary 
Microbiology 85, 323-332. 
FAO, 2006. Food safety risk analysis -- a guide for national food safety authorities.  Available 
from: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0822e/a0822e00.pdf.  
15 
 
Feld, N.C., Ekeroth, L., Gradel, K.O., Kabell, S., Madsen, M., 2000. Evaluation of a 
serological Salmonella Mix-ELISA for poultry used in a national surveillance 
programme. Epidemiology and Infection 125, 263-268. 
Häsler, B., 2011: Economic Assessment of Veterinary Surveillance Programmes that are Part 
of the National Control Plan of Switzerland. PhD thesis, Royal Veterinary College 
(University of London). Available at: http://edepot.wur.nl/121049  
Häsler, B., Howe, K., Di Labio, E., Schwermer, H., Stärk, K.D.C., 2012. Economic 
evaluation of the surveillance and intervention programme for bluetongue virus 
serotype 8 in Switzerland. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 103, 93-111. 
Häsler, B., Howe, K., Stark, K., 2011. Conceptualizing the technical relationship of animal 
disease surveillance to intervention and mitigation as a basis for economic analysis. 
BMC Health Services Research 11, 225. 
Hadorn, D.C., V. Racloz, H. Schwermer, and K.D.C. Stark, 2009: Establishing a cost-
effective national surveillance system for Bluetongue using scenario tree modelling. 
Veterinary Research 40. 
Hoinville, L., Alban, L., Drewe, J., Gibbens, J., Gustafson, L., Häsler, B., Saegerman, C., 
Salman, M., Stärk, K., 2013. Proposed terms and concepts for describing and 
evaluating animal-health surveillance systems. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 112, 
1-12. 
Howe, K., Häsler, B., Stärk, K., 2013. Economic principles for resource allocation decisions 
at national level to mitigate the effects of disease in farm animal populations. 
Epidemiology and Infection 141, 91-101. 
Jonge, J. D., Frewer, L., Trijp, H.V., Renes, R.J., Wit, W. D., Timmers, J., 2004. Monitoring 
consumer confidence in food safety: an exploratory study.  Brit. Food. J. 106, 837-849. 
Klinkenberg, D., Nielen, M., Mourits, M.C.M., de Jong, M.C.M., 2005: The effectiveness of 
classical swine fever surveillance programmes in The Netherlands. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine 67, 19-37. 
Kuiken, T., Ryser-Degiorgis, M.P., Gavier-Widen, D., Gortazar, C., 2011. Establishing a 
European network for wildlife health surveillance. Revue scientifique et technique 30, 
755-761. 
Mangen, M. J. J., 2002: Economic Welfare Analysis of Simulated Control Strategies for 
Classical Swine Fever Epidemics. Mansholt Graduate School. PhD Thesis, 
Wageningen University, Wageningen. Available at: 
16 
 
http://edepot.wur.nl/139421(accessed 28.03.14). 
Martinez, M., Perez, A.M., De La Torre, A., Iglesias, I., Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Munoz, 
M.J., 2011. Evaluating surveillance in wild birds by the application of risk assessment 
of avian influenza introduction into Spain. Epidemiology and Infection 139, 91-98. 
Meuwissen, M.P.M., Horst, S.H., Huirne, R.B.M., Dijkhuizen, A.A., 1999: A model to 
estimate the financial consequences of classical swine fever outbreaks: principles and 
outcomes. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 42 (1999), 249-270. 
Paisley, L.G., Corso, B., P, W., 2011. Epidemiological models for designing and evaluating 
animal disease surveillance systems. Épidémiologie et Santé Animale 59, 401-403. 
Prattley, D.J., R.S. Morris, R.M. Cannon, J.W. Wilesmith, and M.A. Stevenson, 2007: A 
model (BSurvE) for evaluating national surveillance programs for bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 81, 225-235. 
Pultorak, E., Nadler, Y., Travis, D., Glaser, A., McNamara, T., Mehta, S.D., 2011. Zoological 
institution participation in a West Nile virus surveillance system: Implications for 
public health. Public Health 125, 592-599. 
Raulo, S.M., Lyytikainen, T., 2007. Simulated detection of syndromic classical swine fever 
on a Finnish pig-breeding farm. Epidemiol. Infect. 135, 218-227. 
Robertson, C., Sawford, K., Gunawardana, W.S.N., Nelson, T.A., Nathoo, F., Stephen, C., 
2011. A Hidden Markov Model for Analysis of Frontline Veterinary Data for 
Emerging Zoonotic Disease Surveillance. PLoS One 6. 
Saatkamp, H.W., Berentsen, P.B.M., Horst, H.S., 2000: Economic aspects of the control of 
classical swine fever outbreaks in the European Union. Veterinary Microbiology 73, 
221-237. 
Stärk, K., Regula, G., Hernandez, J., Knopf, L., Fuchs, K., Morris, R. Davies, P., 2006: 
Concepts for risk-based surveillance in the field of veterinary medicine and veterinary 
public health: Review of current approaches. BMC Health Services Research 6, 20. 
Stevens K.B., Pfeiffer D.U., 2014. An ecological niche modelling approach using presence-
only disease data for informing risk-based surveillance of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza H5N1. Proceeding ICAHS2 2nd International Conference on Animal Health 
Surveillance Palacio de las Convenciones, The Havana, Cuba, 7-9 May 2014. 
Todd, E., Notermans, S., 2011. Surveillance of listeriosis and its causative pathogen. Food 
Control 22, 1484-1490.       
Ward, M.P., ForbesFaulkner, J.C., Duffy, V.L., 1996. Evaluation of a competitive enzyme-
17 
 
linked immunosorbent assay to detect infection of cattle in sentinel herds in 
Queensland, Australia with bluetongue viruses. Veterinary Microbiology 49, 117-125. 
Willeberg, P., Paisley, L.G., Lind, P., 2011. Epidemiological models to support animal 
disease surveillance activities. Revue scientifique et technique 30, 603-614. 
Wit, 2003. Dutch Food Authority: Objectives and Organization. Acta Hort. (ISHS) 611:33-35 
Available at http://www.actahort.org/books/611/611_7.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Chapter 2 
A conceptual framework for economic optimization of single 
hazard surveillance in livestock production chains 
 
Xuezhen Guo, G.D.H. Claassen, A.G.J.M. Oude Lansink, H.W. Saatkamp 
 
Published in Preventive Veterinary Medicine Volume 114, Issues 3–4, 1 June 2014, Pages 
188–200. DOI: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.02.003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Abstract 
Economic analysis of hazard surveillance in livestock production chains is essential for 
surveillance organizations (such as food safety authorities) when making scientifically-based 
decisions on optimization of resource allocation. To enable this, quantitative decision support 
tools are required at two levels of analysis: (1) single-hazard surveillance system and (2) 
surveillance portfolio. This paper addresses the first level by presenting a conceptual 
approach for the economic analysis of single-hazard surveillance systems. The concept 
includes objective and subjective aspects of single-hazard surveillance system analysis: (1) a 
simulation part to derive an efficient set of surveillance setups based on the technical 
surveillance performance parameters (TSPPs) and the corresponding surveillance costs, i.e., 
objective analysis, and (2) a multi-criteria decision making model to evaluate the impacts of 
the hazard surveillance, i.e., subjective analysis. The conceptual approach was checked for (1) 
conceptual validity and (2) data validity. Issues regarding the practical use of the approach, 
particularly the data requirement, were discussed. It is concluded that the conceptual approach 
is scientifically credible for economic analysis of single-hazard surveillance systems and that 
the practicability of the approach depends on data availability. 
 
Keywords: livestock hazard surveillance, economic analysis, conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Introduction1 
During the last decades, the European Union (EU) has regularly faced major crises in the 
fields of livestock production and food safety. Examples include classical swine fever (CSF) 
during the 1990s in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany; bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in the 1990s in the United Kingdom; dioxins in 1999 in Belgium; and 
highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in the 2000s in several EU countries. Such crises 
not only caused enormous socio-economic impacts (see, e.g., Anonymous, 2002; Asseldonk 
et al., 2005; Longworth et al., 2012ab), but they also resulted in reduced public confidence in 
food production and products (Jonge et al., 2004). 
 
One of the EU’s responses to improve the quality of both food production and products was 
the introduction of new standards to improve surveillance to guarantee the safety in food 
production chains, ranging from visual inspection and blood sampling to second-line 
                                                 
1 A list of abbreviations is included in Appendix A.  
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supervision of surveillance by others, e.g., slaughterhouses. Surveillance
2
 is commonly 
defined as: the systematic collection of data on the occurrence of specific hazards, the analysis 
and interpretation of these data, and the dissemination of consolidated and processed 
information to contributors to the program and other interested persons (Raska, 1966; 
Langmuir, 1971; Kelsey et al., 1986; Dufour and Audige, 1997). According to the World 
Animal Health Organization (OIE), a surveillance system is “a method of surveillance that 
may include one or more component activities that generates information on the health, 
disease or zoonosis status of animal populations”. In agreement with these general definitions, 
and also to avoid terminology ambiguity, subsequent aspects were defined as follows: 
 A single-hazard surveillance system (SHSS) is a surveillance system that aims to detect a 
single microbiological or chemical hazard in a livestock production chain, such as CSF or 
Salmonella surveillance. 
 A surveillance system component (SSC) is a specific surveillance activity within a SHSS; 
for example, clinical diagnosis and routine serological tests in slaughterhouses. Hence, 
each SHSS consists of one or more SSCs. 
 A surveillance setup of a SHSS is the combination of SSCs with their respective levels of 
intensity, e.g., sampling frequency and size. 
 A Surveillance Portfolio (SP): the collection of a group of SHSSs operated by one single 
organization, e.g., a Food Safety Authority or a private slaughterhouse. 
 
The overall optimization problem of any surveillance organization is to maximize 
surveillance performance within given or expected budget constraints. This economic 
surveillance optimization problem can be dealt with at two levels: (1) the SHSS, and (2) the 
surveillance portfolio. This paper focuses on the first level.  
 
Surveillance is an important tool to manage complex system to avoid unfavorable damages.  
In the early stage, many studies on surveillance systems were conducted in military area (e.g., 
Cutrona et al., 1961; Easton and Fleming, 1960; Kaufman, 1964). Later, surveillance systems 
were extensively studied in the fields of engineering (e.g., Kuno, et al., 1996; Haritaoglu et al., 
2000; Muller-Schneiders et al., 2005), human health (e.g., German et al., 2001; Chou et al., 
2004) as well as animal health (e.g. De Vos et al., 2007; Häsler et al., 2012). With regard to 
                                                 
2
 Salman (2003) discussed the difference between monitoring and surveillance and used the term ‘MOSS’ 
(monitoring and surveillance system). For convenience reasons, we use the term “surveillance” interchangeably 
for both monitoring and surveillance. 
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the studies on surveillance system in livestock product chains, a considerable amount of 
literature is available on technical evaluation of SHSSs (Paisley et al., 2011; Willeberg et al., 
2011). Drewe et al. (2012) performed a systematic review of evaluations of SHSSs, observing 
that there is a distinct lack of standardization with regard to such evaluation and only a few of 
these studies included some kind of economic aspect. Drewe et al. (2012) concluded that 
economic evaluation should be an integral part of the evaluation process of surveillance 
systems. Häsler et al. (2011) developed a practical framework for the economic evaluation of 
national SHSSs, with the main objective of guiding decision makers (DMs) in planning, 
designing, and conducting economic evaluations. They made a distinction between situations 
with and without legal or other constraints, and recommended cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) for the former and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for the latter. The framework presented 
by Häsler et al. (2011) provides important steps towards improvement and standardization of 
economic evaluation of SHSSs. However, it focuses primarily on financial evaluations and 
does not account for non-financial impacts such as social unrest and public health or the 
subjective valuation of these impacts. Moreover, the framework appears to be rather ‘open’; 
that is, it leaves ample room for non-harmonization. 
 
The aim of this article is to build further on the abovementioned studies and present a new 
conceptual approach for SHSS analysis. This provides a consistent conceptual basis for the 
development of quantitative tools for decision support, aimed at producing an economic 
evaluation of alternative surveillance options for a SHSS that explicitly emphasizes the 
benefits of hazard surveillance as well as the subjective evaluation by the stakeholders.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The SHSS analysis framework is 
elaborated in Section 2, followed by a numerical example for illustration purpose in Section 3 
and a discussion in Section 4. 
 
2.2 A conceptual framework for economic evaluation of single-hazard surveillance 
systems 
In this section, a three-step evaluation framework for SHSS evaluation is presented (Figure 
2.1). 
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Fig.2.1. General evaluation framework for SHSS evaluation 
 
Step 1 aims to obtain, from a variety of surveillance setups regarding a particular SHSS, the 
most efficient set of setups; that is, those that are not outperformed simultaneously by others 
on the two main criteria: technical surveillance performance parameters (TSPPs) and costs. 
To enable this, the hazard is subject to two distinct processes. 
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Firstly, the dynamics of the hazard within the population must be analyzed
3
, taking the 
following two main features into account: the hazard characteristics (particular those 
influencing spread and expression of symptoms) and the population characteristics (such as 
production chain structure). Such an analysis can be performed using dynamic stochastic 
simulation modeling (see, e.g., CSF (Klinkenberg et al. 2005), BSE (Yamamoto et al. 2008) 
and Salmonella (Van der Gaag et al., 2004)). The model should include two main aspects: (1) 
the dynamics of the hazard as such (that is, the spread of the disease) and (2) the development 
of symptoms within individual animals. For the latter, a generic list of symptoms presented in 
Table 2.1 is proposed.  
 
 
 
The expressions are categorized into non-specific clinical symptoms, suspicious clinical 
symptoms, and pathological findings in blood and organs. After infection, expression of these 
symptoms occurs stochastically and time-dependent (see Appendix B). The symptom 
development (including “viraemia”), together with the within- and between-farm 
transmissions, should aim to provide a population matrix that includes the following three 
levels: 
 Population: farms that are either infected or not infected 
                                                 
3Note: for zero-prevalence hazards, hazard introduction must be assumed, 
Table 2.1 
A general list of hazard related expressions.
Categories of Expressions Examples of Expressions
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific clinical symptoms    Fever, Apathy, Loss of appetite
Suspicious clinical symptoms Skin haemorrhage* 
Specific clinical symptoms Blue tongue**
Pathological findings
In blood Antigens, Antibodies, Chemical substances
In feces Antigens, Chemical substances
In organs Antigens, Chemical substances, lesions
In products Antigens, Chemical substances
Other pathologies Leukopenia*** 
*Suspicious clinical symptom for Classical Swine Fever and African Swine Fever
**Specific clinical symptom for Bluetongue Disease 
***Pathological finding for Classical Swine Fever
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 Farm: the distribution of animals according to varying states of infection 
 Animal: the expression of the various symptoms within that animal. 
 
This matrix is updated at each time-step of the simulation, and hence reflects the dynamics of 
the hazard within the entire population. 
Secondly, the various surveillance setups can be analyzed by subsequently executing each 
setup through sampling of the population matrix at each time-step. This regular time-step 
sampling can include various issues simultaneously; for example, 100 percent daily sampling 
of clinical symptoms at each herd and blood sampling at the slaughterhouse. Depending on (1) 
the development of hazard features within the population, and (2) the intensity of the 
surveillance, at any given moment, sampling will result in an important event, depending on 
the hazard category: detection of the first infected farm, detection of a certain case, or 
observation of a trend change. Subsequently, for this run, the setup, the output parameters 
TSPPs, and costs can be calculated. Finally, analyzing the TSPP-cost combinations per 
surveillance setup can provide the efficient set. 
 
Step 2. Regardless of its category, each hazard has impacts and the improved surveillance can 
decrease these impacts, therefore yielding benefits. For example, CSF has massive economic, 
socio-ethical, and other impacts. Reducing the duration of high risk period (HRP) as well as 
the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP for CSF results in a more favorable 
starting situation for control, and therefore reduced impacts (Burrell, 2002). Each type of 
impact is reflected by its hazard impact indicators (HIIs), e.g. for CSF, HIIs could be the 
number of infected herds in the epidemic, economic losses, and the number of culled animals. 
Given the above, the “impact differences” of various TSPPs on the TSPIs under different 
efficient surveillance setups can be analyzed using hazard impact simulation models (e.g. 
Mangen et al., 2002 (CSF); Longworth et al., 2012ab (HPAI)), provided that the TSPPs can 
explicitly be used as inputs. For example, Klinkerberg et al. (2005) use the number of infected 
farms at the end of the HRP to predict the direct costs of CSF epidemic using Mangen’s 
impact simulation model. In the model of Longworth (2012ab), the link between the duration 
of HRP and different types of impacts can be found. In this way, we can derive the mitigated 
impacts because of the improved surveillance.    
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Finally, since each impact is measured differently, e.g., number of animals, monetary units, 
etc., different impacts can be made comparable by standardizing them to standardized 
performance scores (SPSs); this can be done using equation (1): 
 
𝑣𝑖,𝑠 = {
100 × [𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑠]/[𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0
                                     (1)            
                                
where 
𝑣𝑖,𝑠 is the SPS on HII i, with surveillance setup s.  
𝑃𝑖,𝑠 is the impact parameter on HII i, with surveillance setup s;  
𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum impact parameter on HII i; 
𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum impact parameter on HII i.  
In this way, a SPS with values between 0 and 100 can be obtained. Because small values, 
such as monetary costs, are preferred in some cases and high values, such as an increase in 
consumer surplus, in others, a redirection is sometimes required (Mourits et al., 2010). This 
can be done using equation (2): 
 
𝑣𝑖,𝑠 = {
100 − 100 × [𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑠]/[𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛], 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0
                          (2)                
                                                                                                                             
Step 3. The SPSs per impact obtained in Step 2 are objective; that is, value-free. However, 
each stakeholder subjectively evaluates each impact differently (Walshe and Burgman, 2010). 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the impact on each stakeholder is perceived as being of equal 
importance within society. Although this is ultimately a political decision, it will have an 
impact on the social welfare as such, and hence should be explicitly considered in the decision 
making process. Step 3 aims to obtain a single overall performance score for each 
surveillance setup, taking both above-mentioned issues into account. Firstly, a weighted 
performance score for each stakeholder group should be obtained using equation (3): 
 
𝑉𝑔,𝑠 = ∑ 𝑤𝑔,𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑠
𝐼
𝑖=1   for all g and all s                                                                                  (3)                   
where 
𝑉𝑔,𝑠 is the weighted performance score for stakeholder group g regarding surveillance setup s; 
𝑤𝑔,𝑖 is the weight assigned by stakeholder group g to HII i, and ∑ 𝑤𝑔,𝑖 = 1
𝐼
𝑖=1 ; 
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I denotes the number of HIIs considered.      
For equation (3), two assumptions should hold: linear utility functions with respect to the 
SPSs of the HIIs and mutual preferential independency between HIIs. Clemen and Reilly 
(2001) and Mourits et al. (2010) have intensively justified the appropriateness of these two 
assumptions. 
 
The weights are obtained per stakeholder group and reflect the preference of each stakeholder 
group on different HIIs. Various elicitation procedures can be used, including conjoint 
analysis (Green and Srinivasan, 1990) and the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) technique 
(Saaty, 2005). 
 
After obtaining the weighted performance score per stakeholder group for the various 
surveillance setups, the final step is to account for differences in the importance of 
stakeholder groups through the weighting, as shown in equation (4): 
𝑉𝑠 = ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑉𝑔,𝑠 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑔𝑤𝑔,𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑠
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝐺
𝑔=1
𝐺
𝑔=1    for all s                                                   (4)                               
 
where 
𝑉𝑠  is the overall weighted performance for implementing surveillance setup s; 
𝑤𝑔 is the weight assigned by the decision maker to stakeholder group g (note: the sum of the 
weights 𝑤𝑔 should be equal to 1); 
G denotes the number of stakeholder groups. 
The weights, wg, should be obtained from the DM, using a similar elicitation technique as for 
wg,i.  
 
2.3 Numerical example 
In this section, to illustrate the presented conceptual framework, a hypothetical case of a 
SHSS for CSF in the Netherlands is elaborated as a shortcut model. The at-risk population 
included 2300 farrowing, 5000 finishing and 360 farrow-to-finish pig herds (see Table 2.2). 
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A randomly selected herd was assumed to be the index premise. The within-farm and 
between-farm transmission parameters were derived from (Klinkenberg et al., 2003; 
Klinkenberg et al., 2005): βw=0.21 and βb=0.0024, respectively. The applied strain of CSF is 
assumed to be highly virulent and the expression-probability matrix for modelling CSF-
related symptoms is presented in Table B1 (Appendix B). The matrix builds upon the 
literature, as indicated in the table, and was confirmed by the CSF expert from the Central 
Veterinarian Institute. By way of comparison, a low-virulent strain example is also shown 
with a different expression-probability matrix, as described in Table B2 (Appendix B).     
The main features of the various SSCs included are described in Table 2.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2
The distributions of farm types and animals
Farm type Number of farms Number of animals per farm
Piglet Sow Slaughter pigs
Farrowing  2300 2000 400 0
Finishing 5000 0 0 830
Farrow-to-finish 360 1090 220 800
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Table 2.3
The SSCs that could be employed to detect CSF in the Netherlands
SSC Sensitivities Application frequency Sampling size Cost for Farmers Cost for FSA
Daily clinical observation
 To call a veterinarian: Every day All animals No No
by the farmer 20% to 100%
ab 
To submit an animal to AHS
*
:
20% to 100%
ab
Veterinarian inspection   32%
ab 
After a call All animals 70€/visit
a
or once per four weeks All animals 1175€/herd/year
ad
 
Pathology 50%
ab 
After the serevely diseased  All animals submitted 
 50€/animal
ad 
350€/animal
ad 
animal submitted to AHS to AHS
Tonsil virology 
Setonsil
5
=60%
a
After the serevely diseased All submitted animals 166000 €/year
ad
animal submitted to AHS
Blood and tonsil analysis 100%
a
In case of a CSF suspicion  All animals with CSF 3170 €/case
ad 
on farm  suspicion
Routine serology ELISA 99%
c  
A batch/week 5 animals/batch 8.8 €/test
e 
PCR on rendered animal 98%
b 
Dead animals All dead animals 27 €/test
f
a
Klinkenberg et al., (2005)
b 
Backer et al., (2011)
c
Colijn et al., (1997)
d
VWA report, (2003)
e
Anonymus, (2011)
f
De Vos et al., (2005)
*Animal health service
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Following Dutch protocol (VWA, 2003; Klinkenberg et al., 2005), the default setup (Def) 
included five SSCs: (1) clinical inspection by the farmer, (2) clinical inspection by a 
veterinarian, (3) pathology, (4) tonsil virology, and (5) blood and tonsil analysis (after CSF 
suspicion). In addition to Def, five alternative surveillance setups were also investigated, 
including Def+S5, Def+S10, Def+R20, Def+R33 and Def+R100.  Def+S5 and Def+S10 
denote the default surveillance setup plus routine serological testing in slaughterhouses with 
the sample size 5 and 10 animals per batch respectively. Def+R20, Def+R33 and Def+R100 
indicate the default surveillance setup plus polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing on 
rendered animals with the sample sizes, 20%, 33.3%, and 100% of the total dead animals 
respectively. Each simulation run included 1,000 iterations. The used TSPIs are the duration 
of the HRP and the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP.  
 
2.3.1 Step 1: Obtaining the efficient set of surveillance setups 
In Table 2.4, the simulation results for five surveillance setups are presented, taking account 
for both high- and low-virulent CSFV strains.  
 
 
 
Table 2.4
Simulated results (percentiles) of technical performances for both high and low virulent CSF strains 
Surveillance setup Highly virulent strain Low virulent strain
HRP duration (day) The number HRP duration (day) The number
 infected farms   infected farms  
at the end of HRP at the end of HRP
5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
Def
1
27 36 50 1 4 14 51 76 113 1 4 9
Def + S5
2
27 36 49 1 4 13 46 72 108 1 3 8
Def + S10
3
27 36 48 1 4 13 41 68 103 1 3 8
Def + R20
4
20 33 42 1 3 7 51 76 113 1 4 9
Def + R33
5
20 21 34 1 2 4 51 76 113 1 4 9
Def + R100
6
19 20 21 1 1 3 51 76 113 1 4 9
1
Default surviellance setup
2
Default surveillance setup + routine serological testing in slaughterhouses with the sample size 5 animal per batch 
3
Default surveillance setup + routine serological testing in slaughterhouses with the sample size 10 animal per batch
4
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 20% of the total dead animals 
5
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 33% of the total dead animals
6
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 100% of the total dead animals
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For the high-virulent strain, the results show for Def a median HRP of 36 days with four 
infected farms at the end of the HRP. These figures increase to 50 days and 14 farms, 
respectively, with the 95th percentile. Additional serology in the slaughterhouses (Def+S5 
and Def+S10) hardly affects these results: only a small reduction with the 95% percentile can 
be observed. In contrast, additional PCR testing on rendered animals (Def+R20, Def+R33 and 
Def+R100) does reduce HRP, which decreases with sampling size. For the low-virulent strain, 
the results show the opposite. The default HRP increased to 76 days at the median, while the 
number of infected farms at the end of the HRP remains more or less the same. In contrast to 
the high-virulent strain, however, the impact of PCR testing is virtually absent, whereas the 
impact of serology at the slaughterhouses does have a reducing impact, particularly on the 
HRP.     
 
Table 2.5 presents the simulated daily surveillance costs for the respective surveillance setups 
and situations and lists the total costs, costs for the Food Safety Authority (FSA) and costs for 
the collective farmers. 
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Table 2.5
Simulated results (percentiles) of the daily average surveillance costs for both high and low virulent CSF strains (k€)
Surveillance setup
Total average daily costs Average daily costs Average daily costs Total average daily costs Average daily costs Average daily costs 
 for FSA for farmers  for FSA for farmers
5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
Def
1
25.1 25.1 25.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 24.7 24.7 24.7 25.1 25.1 25.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 24.7 24.7 24.7
Def + S5
2
58.6 58.8 59.1 33.9 34.2 34.4 24.7 24.7 24.7 58.7 58.8 59.0 34.0 34.2 34.3 24.7 24.7 24.7
Def + S10
3
92.0 92.5 93.0 67.4 67.9 68.3 24.7 24.7 24.6 92.2 92.5 92.9 67.5 67.9 68.2 24.7 24.7 24.7
Def + R20
4
40.4 40.4 40.5 15.8 15.8 15.9 24.7 24.7 24.7 40.4 40.4 40.5 15.8 15.8 15.8 24.7 24.7 24.7
Def + R33
5
50.6 50.6 50.8 26.0 26.0 26.1 24.7 24.7 24.7 50.6 50.6 50.7 25.9 26.0 26.1 24.7 24.7 24.7
Def + R100
6
101.6 101.7 102.1 76.9 77.0 77.5 24.7 24.7 24.7 101.6 101.7 101.9 76.9 77.0 77.3 24.7 24.7 24.7
1
Default surviellance setup
2
Default surveillance setup + routine serological testing in slaughterhouses with the sample size 5 animal per batch 
3
Default surveillance setup + routine serological testing in slaughterhouses with the sample size 10 animal per batch
4
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 20% of the total dead animals 
5
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 33% of the total dead animals
6
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 100% of the total dead animals
Low virulent strainHighly virulent strain
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Large differences in costs between surveillance setups can be observed, ranging from total 
costs of 25 k€ for Def to 101 k€ for Def+R100. Differences within a setup between 
percentiles are virtually absent because routine costs are dominating. Moreover, quite some 
differences can be observed between the costs for the FSA and farmers. Since it was assumed 
that costs associated with additional serology and PCR testing would accrue to the FSA, costs 
for the latter increase with more intensified surveillance setups.  
 
Mathematically, surveillance setups included in the efficient set will fulfil the following 
conditions: 
s
*
 is an efficient surveillance setup, if there is no other setup s such that  
C(s) ≤ C(s*) (total daily surveillance costs) 
and 
P(s) ≤ P(s*) (duration of HRP) 
with at least one strict inequality (Ben-Israel et al., 1977).   
 
Combining the median outcomes of the performance (Table 2.4) and the costs (Table 2.5), the 
efficient set of surveillance setups are circled in Figure 2.2.  
 
Fig.2.2. The efficient surveillance setups for the high and low virulent strains 
 
In case of the high-virulent CSFV, Def+S5 and Def+S10 are dominated by the other setups; in 
case of the low-virulent CSFV, Def+R20, Def+R33 and Def+R100 are dominated by others.  
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2.3.2 Step 2: Obtaining standardized performance scores    
For the surveillance setups included in the efficient set for the high-virulent CSFV, the 
impacts of the TSPPs on outbreaks of CSF were estimated. This was done using the CSF 
simulation approach described by Mangen et al. (2001) for Def, and estimations based on this 
for Def+R20, Def+R33 and Def+R100. Although diseases can have an impact on a range of 
HIIs (see, e.g., Mourits et al., 2010), only a few were included in the present analysis, for the 
sake of simplicity. The impact parameters on each HII for each efficient surveillance setup are 
presented in Table 2.6 (upper part).  
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Table 2.6
Impact parameters, standardized impact scores, weights on indicators and on stakeholders for each surveillance setup in the efficient set
Parameters and weights
The duration of The number of Total annual Total annual Total annual Total annual 
the epidemic infected farms losses for farmers losses for society human human
(day) in the epidemic (k€) (k€) infections deaths 
(farm) (person) (person)
Hazard Impact Indicators 
Def
1
164* 99* 12,000* 11,8000* 0 0
Def + R20
2
115 35 10,000 100,000 0 0
Def+ R33
3
90 15 1,000 10,000 0 0
Def + R100
4
76 5 800 8,000 0 0
Standardized performance scores:
Def 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Def + R20 55.7 68.1 17.9 16.4 0.0 0.0
Def+ R33 84.1 89.4 98.2 98.2 0.0 0.0
Def + R100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Weights on indicators: 
  w g : w g,i :
   Farmers  (w1=0.3) w 1,1=0.21 w 1,2=0.09 w 1,3=0.45 w 1,4=0.05 w 1,5=0.04 w 1,6=0.16
   Citizens   (w2=0.7) w 2,1=0.1 w 2,2=0.1 w 2,3=0.04 w 2,4=0.16 w 2,5=0.12 w 2,6=0.48
1
Default surviellance setup
2
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 20% of the total dead animals 
3
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 33% of the total dead animals
4
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 100% of the total dead animals
*The impact parameters under the default situation (the default surveillance setup + non-vaccination and preventive-slaughter control strategy)  are 
estimated based on Mangen, et al. (2001). The detailed estimation of the annual losses for farmers and society is presented in Appendix C. 
Epidemiology Economics Human health 
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With Def, the largest impact was observed with 99 infected farms in 164 days. The associated 
costs for farmers and society were 12,000 and 118,000 k€, respectively (For the details see 
Appendix C). Since CSF is not a zoonosis, human casualties are absent. Improving the TSPPs 
(Table 2.4) of the surveillance reduced the impacts (Table 2.6).  
 
These impact parameters on HIIs were transformed into SPSs using equation (1), and results 
are presented in Table 2.6 (middle part). The lowest impact parameter on each HII was given 
an SPS value of 100. On all HIIs, Def performed the worst and therefore the SPSs were 0.  
 
Finally, subjective weights of the respective HIIs, wg,i, are presented in Table 2.6 (lowest part). 
These weights were hypothetically generated, with the underlying assumption that farmers 
have a higher preference for economic losses, while citizens put a higher weight on human 
health-related HIIs, especially on “total annual human deaths”.  
 
2.3.3  Step 3: Subjective evaluation of the impacts   
The SPSs are transformed into the weighted performance score per stakeholder group by 
multiplying the SPSs and the respective weights on corresponding HIIs, wg,i, of Table 2.6 in 
equation (3); then, multiplying the DMs’ weights, wg, in equation (4) provides the overall 
weighted performance score. All of the results are presented in Table 2.7. 
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According to the weighted performance scores for two stakeholder groups, farmers have a 
higher level of preference than citizens, because the impact on human health (which has a 
high preference with citizens) does not apply to CSF and therefore to the overall impact. 
Moreover, it can be seen that farmers have a slightly higher preference for Def+R100 over 
Def+R33 (80 versus 74.8), and citizens have even closer preference for the two setups (40 
versus 37).      
 
2.4 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents a conceptual approach for economic analysis of single-hazard surveillance 
system. Unlike the existing literature, the approach not only considers various socio-economic 
impacts due to hazard surveillance, but also includes subjective valuation of such impacts by 
different stakeholders. In so doing, it provides an improved basis for conducting quantitative 
modeling research on SHSS evaluation and enables in-depth, cost-effectiveness analysis of 
SHSS that accounts for the preferences of stakeholders. To judge whether the approach could 
fulfill its intended purpose, insights should be obtained regarding the scientific credibility and 
the practicability of the approach. 
Table 2.7
The weighted performance score per stakeholder group and the overall weighted perfromance 
Stakeholder group Surveillance setup Weighted performance 
Farmers Def
1
0.0
Def + R20
2
26.7
Def + R33
3
74.8
Def + R100
4
80.0
Citizens Def 0.0
Def + R20 15.7
Def + R33 37.0
Def + R100 40.0
Overall Def 0.0
Def + R20 19.0
Def + R33 48.3
Def + R100 52.0
1
Default surviellance setup
2
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 20% of the total dead animals 
3
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 33% of the total dead animals
4
Default surveillance setup + PCR testing on rendered animals with the sample size 100% of the total dead animals
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2.4.1 Scientific Credibility of the approach  
It is self-evident that the internal validation has been conducted extensively. Therefore, this 
section only discusses the conceptual validity and data validity.  
 
2.4.1.1 Conceptual validity 
The developed approach attempts to tackle the SHSS analysis problem in three steps (see Fig. 
2.1). In step 1, a simulation model is developed with two separate modules: (1) simulation of 
hazard dynamic and (2) simulation of the sampling process (subject to a surveillance setup) 
on the referred animal population. For dynamic hazard simulation, the hazard expression-
probability matrix (see Appendix B) is proposed to more realistically model the symptoms 
development for infected animals. The classical SIR model (e.g., Stegeman et al., 2004 (HPAI) 
and Klinkenberg et al., 2005 (CSF)) is used to model the within- and between-farm hazard 
spread. The development of the hazard, in terms of symptom occurrence and hazard spread, 
results in a three-level population matrix that mimics the real-life situation of the hazard status 
in the animal population: (1) infected farms in the country, (2) infected animals on the 
infected farms, and (3) symptoms in the infected animals. Compared to existing models for 
disease surveillance (e.g., Klinkenberg et al., 2005; Backer et al., 2011), the proposed 
simulation model makes a conceptual improvement in that it makes more biological sense and 
mimics the real life better (Taylor, 2003); this is particularly the case with sampling on the 
three-level population matrix, which is close to the real-life situation. However, the main 
drawback of the proposed model is that it is quite data-intensive to construct. After obtaining 
the technical performances and the associated costs for various possible surveillance setups, 
an efficient set of surveillance setups are derived based on the commonly used Pareto 
Efficiency Principle (e.g., Ben-Israel et al., 1977). Eliminating the dominated surveillance 
setups can save a large amount of work for the following analysis.  
 
In step 2, the efficient surveillance setups of the SHSS will be analyzed further on its socio-
economic impacts, that is, the benefits of the SHSS. Häsler (2011) noted that economic 
assessment of surveillance can be conducted at two levels: (1) cost-effectiveness assessment 
and (2) cost-benefit assessment; one important drawback of the cost-effectiveness assessment 
is that it cannot quantify the benefits of the SHSS. To the best knowledge of the authors, the 
present study is the first to explicitly incorporate the benefits from surveillance to SHSS 
analysis in the field of animal health studies. In this sense, it represents an advance for cost-
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benefit assessment of the SHSS in that field.  To enable the cost-benefit assessment, a list of 
HIIs is selected to measure different types of impacts, such as the duration of the epidemic, 
monetary losses for the farmers, etc. The impact parameters on HIIs can be obtained using the 
impact assessment models. Such models have been presented by, e.g. classical swine fever 
(Mangen et al., 2002), salmonella (Goldbach and Alban, 2006), and avian influenza 
(Longworth et al., 2012 (HPAI)). However, such extensive impact assessment models are not 
available for all hazards. Where such models are lacking, the impact parameters should be 
estimated by experts (e.g., Asseldonk et al. (2005) for epidemiological impacts of CSF, FMD, 
and HPAI, and Senturk and Yalcin (2005) for financial impacts of FMD). Once obtained, the 
impact parameters are standardized using equations (1) or (2), a typical normalization method 
(e.g., Sorace and Zhan, 2003; Ginevicius, 2008), to make the impact parameters comparable 
between HIIs. Hereby, it is necessary to point out that since this is a conceptual article, only 
the most commonly used benefits were considered. In the real application of the concept, 
more types of benefits can be included and tailor-made to need of the analysis for specific 
hazards, e.g., including the mitigation of public uneasiness, physiological problem for animal 
owners, etc. 
 
In the third step, multi-criteria decision making is used to incorporate stakeholders’ 
preferences to evaluate different types of impacts, e.g. monetary values versus human deaths, 
comparable. Each type of impact is captured by a HII and the weighted sum of the impact 
parameters on HIIs is used to measure the weighted performance of a surveillance setup (see 
equation (3)). These kind of multi-criteria decision making models have been broadly used for 
multi-criteria decision analysis, in the animal-health-related field (e.g., Ohashi et al., 2010; 
Mourits, et al., 2010) and in other disciplines (e.g., Mendoza and Martins, 2006; Vaidogas 
and Sakenaite, 2011). Well-defined elicitation techniques such as conjoint analysis (Green 
and Srinivasan, 1990) and analytical hierarchy process (Saaty, 2005) can be used to derive the 
“importance weights” on different HIIs and stakeholder groups.  
 
Finally, the overall appropriateness of the concept has been confirmed by relevant experts
4
 
who did not identify any serious omissions or problems. Therefore, from a conceptual point of 
view, it is concluded that there is no reason to invalidate the approach.  
 
                                                 
4
 Experts from the Dutch FSAs (NVWA and PVE), the food company VION and Central Veterinary Institute 
(CVI) are consulted.   
39 
 
2.4.1.2 Data validity  
Various types of data are required at each step of the conceptual approach. In step 1, two 
types of data are important to parameterize the simulation model: (1) the data for hazard 
spread, that is, the within- and between-farm transmission parameters, and (2) the data for 
expression development, that is, the symptoms’ occurrence probabilities in the expression-
probability matrix. Some hazards’ transmission parameters can be obtained directly from the 
literature, e.g., HPAI (Stegeman et al., 2004) and CSF (Klinkenberg et al., 2005). However, it 
is more difficult to obtain the probabilities of symptom occurrences. Firstly, an extensive 
literature study is required to retrieve the raw data from a range of sources, such as infection 
experiments and epidemiological surveys. Then, given that the conditions (e.g. the types and 
ages of the animals) to derive the raw data may vary from one source to another, it is 
impossible to obtain the directly suitable information to fill in the expression-probability 
matrix. Therefore, relevant experts should be consulted in order to translate the raw data into a 
form that exactly fits the expression-probability matrix. Here, it must be noted that this data is 
not available for all hazards. It is relatively easy to obtain such data for diseases such as CSF 
and HPAI, but may not be for other diseases, which can raise the problem of approach 
application.   
 
In step 2, the data, that is, the impact parameters on HIIs for implementing each efficient 
surveillance setup is required. This data can be obtained using impact assessment simulation 
models (e.g., Mangen et al., 2002 (CSF); Goldbach and Alban, 2006 (salmonella); Longworth 
et al., 2012 (HPAI)). When such models are lacking for a less-studied hazard, expert options 
can be used to obtain the impact parameters (e.g., Asseldonk et al., 2005; Senturk and Yalcin, 
2005).  
 
In step 3, the preferences, reflected by weights, on different HIIs and stakeholder groups are 
required. These weights can be derived through stakeholder and decision-maker elicitation 
using the well-defined preference elicitation techniques such as conjoint analysis and AHP.  
 
Hence, the data for the approach can be obtained through a variety of scientifically accepted 
methods and the data validity of the conceptual approach can be asserted. 
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2.4.2 Practicability of the approach   
The full practicability of the approach overall relies heavily on the data availability for the 
studied hazard, including the data for disease spread and expression development (step 1), the 
data for impact parameters derived from the impact assessment models (step 2), and the data 
for the elicited weights on HIIs (step 3). Firstly, for the well-studied hazards such as CSF, 
FMD, and AI, the data required in all three steps are available, which enables the thorough 
application of the approach to surveillance assessment. Secondly, for the less-studied hazards, 
the required data may only be partly available, e.g., the data for spread and expression 
development for swine vesicular disease can be obtained from the literature (Dekker et al., 
1995; Hakhverdyan et al., 2006). However, the data for the socio-economic impacts of swine 
vesicular disease are missing. In such cases, using expert knowledge is the only alternative to 
estimate the impact parameters so that the developed approach can still be applied in a semi-
quantitative way. Finally, if the hazard is less studied and no required data exists, the 
approach will still have merit as a guideline to facilitate qualitative reasoning.                        
 
2.4.3 Conclusion  
From a conceptual perspective, it can be concluded that the proposed approach has scientific 
credibility; that is, its credibility cannot be invalidated. From a practical viewpoint, 
applicability relies heavily on the availability of data, which varies among hazards. 
Nevertheless, even in the absence of the data for one or more steps of the framework, the 
proposed concept provides a good scientific rationale for economic analysis of the SHSS.     
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Appendix A 
 
 
Abbrevations
Term Meaning
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process 
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CBA Cost-benefit Analysis 
CEA Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
CSF Classical Swine Fever 
DALY Daily Adjusted Life Year 
Def Default Surveillance Setup
DM Decision Maker
EFSA European Food Safety Authority 
EU European Union
FMD Foot and Mouth disease
FSA Food Safety Authorities 
HII Hazard Impact Indicator 
HPAI Highly-pathogenic Avian Influenza 
HRP High Risk Period
OIE World Animal Health Organization 
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction 
R PCR Testing on Rendered Animals 
S Serological Tests in Slaugherhouses
SHSS Single Hazard Surveillance System 
TSPI Technical Surveillance Performance Indicator
TSPP Technical Surveillance Performance Parameter
SPS Standardized Performance Scores 
SSC Surveillance System Component 
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Appendix B  
Table B1
The expression matrix for disseased animals infected by the highly virulent CSF strain
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 References
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, n 
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 d, e, f, g, h, j, n 
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  d, e, f, g, h, j, n 
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 i, n 
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75             d, g, h, n  
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 d, e, g, h, j, n 
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 d, g, h, n 
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.74 j, n 
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.68 0.73 g, j, k, n 
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.72 g, j, n 
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 f, h, l, n  
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 m, n 
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.65 0.65 n
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 n
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 n
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 n
a
Summerfield et al. (1998)
b
Kaden et al. (2007)
c
Sainz et al. (2008)
d
Prodanov et al. (2007)
e
Wang et al. (2008)
f
Handel et al. (2004)      
g
Núñez et al. (2005)      
h
Terpstra (1991)
i
Depner et al. (1999)
jPolaček et al. (2007)    
k
Li, et al. (2010) 
L
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
m
Colijn et al. (1997)
n
Expert opinion
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing expressions for infected individual animals  
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Table B2
The expression matrix for disseased animals infected by the low virulent CSF strain
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d, e, k
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.2 0 0 0 a, b, k
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1.00 f, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
a
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009b)
c
Floegel-Niesmann et al. (2003)
d
Terpstra (1991)
e
Liess (1988)
f 
Colijn et al. (1997)
g
Mittelholzer et al. (2000)
k
expert opinion 
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing expressions for infected individual animals  
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Appendix C 
The annual costs for the farmers and society under the default surveillance setup are estimated 
as follows: first, according to Mangen et al. (2001), the costs for farmers (including the 
preventive slaughter costs and consequential costs for farmers) is 120 million euros per 
epidemic. We assume the annual introduction probability of CSF to the Netherlands is 0.1. 
Therefore, the annual costs for farmers because of the CSF is 120*0.1=12 million euros.  
 
Second, according to Mangen et al. (2001), the total direct costs and direct consequential 
costs are 590 million euro per epidemic. Moreover, there are also the costs because of the 
trade ban due to CSF. Hence, we assume the same amount of trade-loss costs (590 million 
euros per epidemic) are incurred. Therefore, the annual costs because of CSF for the society is 
approximately 118 million euros ((590+590)*0.1). 
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Abstract 
Decision making on hazard surveillance in livestock product chains is a multi-hazard, multi-
stakeholder, and multi-criteria process that focuses on a variety of decision alternatives. The 
multi-hazard aspect means that the allocation of the scarce resource for surveillance should be 
optimized from the point of view of a surveillance portfolio (SP) rather than a single hazard. 
In this paper, we present a novel conceptual approach for economic optimization of a 
surveillance portfolio to address the resource allocation problem for a surveillance 
organization from a theoretical perspective. This approach has been checked for conceptual 
validity and data validity, and the practicability of the approach was also discussed.  
 
Keywords: hazard surveillance, surveillance portfolio optimization, conceptual framework, 
economic analysis  
 
3.1 Introduction 5 
A surveillance organization, such as a Food Safety Authority (FSA), often has multiple 
hazards to survey with limited surveillance resource (i.e. budget). Therefore, the allocation of 
the scarce surveillance resource should be optimized from the perspective of a surveillance 
portfolio (SP) rather than a single hazard. To avoid terminology ambiguity, we present the 
following terms that have been defined in Guo et al. (2014) at the beginning of this paper: 
 
 A single-hazard surveillance system (SHSS) is a surveillance system that aims to detect a 
single microbiological or chemical hazard in a livestock production chain, such as 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF) or Salmonella surveillance. 
 A surveillance system component (SSC) is a specific surveillance activity within a SHSS; 
for example, clinical diagnosis and routine serological tests in slaughterhouses. Hence, 
each SHSS consists of one or more SSCs. 
 A surveillance setup of a SHSS is the combination of SSCs with their respective levels of 
intensity, e.g., sampling frequency and size. 
 A Surveillance Portfolio (SP): the collection of a group of SHSSs operated by one single 
organization, e.g., a Food Safety Authority or a private slaughterhouse. 
 
                                                 
5 A list of abbreviations is included in the appendix.  
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Many studies have been conducted to analyze the performance of SHSS (e.g., Feld et al., 
2000; Raulo and Lyytikainen, 2007; Häsler et al., 2011; Martinez et al., 2011; Todd and 
Notermans, 2011; Häsler et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2013; Durr et al., 2013). In contrast, only 
two studies on SP are available. Prattley et al. (2007) and Prattley (2009) presented an 
approach of risk-based resource allocation for surveillance on exotic livestock diseases in 
New Zealand. The authors demonstrated the potential of portfolio theory for prioritizing 
between various surveillance options and optimizing resource allocation between these 
options. They also identified issues for further research, such as the risk attitude of decision 
makers, weighing of risks and impacts, and the problem of increasing the complexity of 
decision support with increased portfolios. However, the authors did not offer a suggestion for 
how these issues should be tackled in a consistent way. Moreover, the authors restricted their 
attention to exotic livestock diseases only, not including other types of hazards (e.g. endemic 
diseases, chemical hazards). To the best of our knowledge, there is no other literature on 
economics of SP.  
 
The aim of this paper is to build further on Prattley’s studies and present a conceptual 
approach for SP optimization that provides a consistent conceptual basis for the development 
of quantitative tools for decision support, aimed at the economic optimization of a SP. The 
framework is elaborated from the FSA’s point of view, but it can be also used by other 
surveillance organizations, such as private companies. The SHSS framework that has been 
elaborated in Guo et al., (2014) serves as the basis of the SP optimization framework: the 
analytical results of each SHSS are used as the inputs of the SP optimization model.      
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly puts the role of FSAs 
into perspective, and Section 3 provides hazard categorization. This is followed by 
elaborations for the framework of SP optimization (Section 4) and a discussion (Section 5). 
 
3.2 Food safety authorities and surveillance optimization as a multi-criteria, multi-
stakeholder problem 
An FSA is a public body founded to serve the interests of the general public. Its primary role 
in this respect is to allocate resources to surveillance activities in order to contribute to the 
maximization of social welfare or the minimization of social dis-welfare. This includes not 
only its own (public) resources, but also involvement of private resources (such as farms and 
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slaughterhouse labor and mandatory test costs). Trade-offs can exist between public and 
private resources (e.g. in the case of control-of-control), as well as an asymmetric distribution 
of these resources between stakeholders. The latter is even more prominent when the benefits 
of improved surveillance are concerned. For example, a reduced impact of an avian influenza 
(AI) epidemic because of “early detection of the virus” includes mitigated human health 
burden, fewer animals being culled, a reduced impact on animal welfare and socio ethics, and 
less disruption of social life. All of these criteria are subjectively evaluated by the 
stakeholders involved (Mourits et al., 2010). Hence, there is a large asymmetry between 
stakeholders regarding both resources (that is, costs) and benefits, which could cause conflicts 
of interest. The prime decision maker (DM) role of a FSA or any surveillance organization is 
to allocate the surveillance resources in such a way that all stakeholders collectively evaluate 
the ultimate outcome (that is, total surveillance performance) as maximal. 
 
An arbitrary distinction can be made between those stakeholders that are directly and 
indirectly affected by surveillance. The directly affected stakeholders, which include farmers, 
the processing industry, and retailers, can be actively involved in surveillance (e.g. required 
labor), will be directly affected by changes in surveillance performance (e.g. increased or 
reduced risks of CSF outbreaks) and will have their production costs directly affected by 
(changes in) surveillance costs. Indirectly affected stakeholders include the general public and 
non-governmental organizations: changes in surveillance costs and/or performance could, 
through the livestock production chain, result in higher/lower prices and/or higher/lower risks. 
 
3.3 Hazard categorization 
Any FSA, and in fact most surveillance organizations, operate SHSSs for various hazards, all 
of which have specific features with regard to hazard type, surveillance objectives and 
occurrence possibilities. Figure 3.1 presents an overview of a hazard categorization.  
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Fig.3.1. SHSS categorization scheme 
 
Starting with all hazards that can, in principle, be surveyed, an initial distinction can be made 
between biological (viruses, bacteria, prions, etc.) and chemical (contaminants, toxins, etc.) 
hazards. The main reason for this distinction is the different dynamics of these hazards in an 
animal population. Biological hazards in principle multiply and spread between infected 
animals, resulting in an increasing number of affected animals over time. Chemical hazards 
dilute after entering the livestock production chains (assuming only one entrance, such as a 
contaminated batch of feed): once entered, the concentration will reduce due to growth of the 
animal and/or through vertical dilution (e.g. dioxin from a sow to its offspring). 
 
A subsequent categorization feature is prevalence. Biological hazards can be either absent in 
normal conditions (that is, epidemic or zero-prevalence hazards such as CSF and FMD), 
while prevalence cannot be excluded but is extremely low (that is, close-to-zero prevalence 
hazards, such as BSE) or have a higher prevalence (e.g. endemic hazards such as salmonella). 
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For chemical hazards, higher prevalence is assumed to be non-hazardous and hence 
disregarded, leaving zero-prevalence (that is, not allowed, such as added hormones) and low-
prevalence (that is, having a very low threshold, such as residuals of pesticides) hazards. 
However, it is noteworthy that this difference is partially artificial, caused by the current 
technical inability to detect. 
 
From the prevalence situation, the ultimate surveillance objective can be derived, together 
with the associated technical surveillance performance indicator (TSPI). The aim of zero-
prevalence hazard surveillance is to detect hazards such as CSF or FMD as soon as possible 
from the moment of introduction in the population. This is reflected by minimizing the so-
called High-Risk Period (HRP). Therefore, important TSPIs are the length of the HRP and the 
number of infected farms at the end of this HRP (as a measure for disease spread during the 
HRP). For close-to-zero hazards, detection of all existing cases before they pose a danger to 
the general public is the main objective; hence, the detection probability is an important TSPI. 
Higher-prevalence hazards are and will be endemic for some time. Therefore, reliable trend 
monitoring could be a main goal, e.g. to monitor the impact of control and reduction measures. 
Hence, the time-lag until detection of important changes in prevalence levels and trends in 
this area, as well as the reliability and accuracy of this detection, are important TSPIs. Similar 
objectives and TSPIs can be defined for both zero- and low-prevalence chemical hazards. 
 
3.4 A conceptual framework for economic optimization 
Surveillance organizations operate various SHSSs with limited resources. The (economically) 
optimal SP includes (1) those SHSSs with (2) their respective setups that combine to achieve 
maximum surveillance performance with limited resources and other constraints. Hence, a 
surveillance organization must make choices at two levels: (1) between SHSSs and (2) 
between surveillance setups of a SHSS. Figure 3.2 illustrates this decision problem. Including 
a SHSS in the SP automatically implies that a particular setup must be chosen.  
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Fig.3.2. The conceptual framework for SP optimization
58 
 
This choice results in technical surveillance performance parameter (TSPPs), such as duration 
of the High Risk Period (HRP), and in turn, a consequent (reduction in) impacts (e.g. 
economic losses, human health impact). Moreover, surveillance costs are incurred from 
applying this setup. Similarly, other hazards (that is, SHSS) must be considered, as well as the 
subjective valuation by the stakeholders. 
In order to elaborate the optimization problem, the following problems must be solved: 
 the various impacts each hazard has must be made comparable and additive; 
 differences in valuation of stakeholders of different impacts must be allowed, as well as 
interest differences between stakeholders. 
Below, an attempt has been made to solve this problem in a conceptual manner in order to 
enable economic optimization of a SP. 
Step 1. Each SP consists of a set of SHSSs, so a list of potential hazards and associated SHSSs 
must first be identified. Next, for each SHSS the efficient set of surveillance setups must be 
identified (details has been presented in Guo et al., 2014). Thereafter, for each hazard impact 
indicator (HII) i, the standardized portfolio performance should be calculated using equation 
(1): 
𝑣𝑖(𝑋) = 100 ×
∑ ∑ (𝑃ℎ,𝑖
0 −𝑥ℎ,𝑠𝑃ℎ,𝑖,𝑠)
𝑆ℎ
𝑠=1
𝐻
ℎ=1
∑ (𝑃ℎ,𝑖
0 −𝑃ℎ,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥)𝐻ℎ=1
    for all i                                       (1) 
where only one or no surveillance setup for each hazard h is implemented (see constraint (3)); 
𝑣𝑖(𝑋) denotes the standardized portfolio performance (SPP) on HII i , which is actually the 
performance deviation on HII i, compared to the performance of the maximum portfolio 
performance on HII i; 
X is the decision variable matrix of xh,s.  
𝑥ℎ,𝑠 denotes the binary decision variable to judge whether, for hazard h, surveillance setup s is 
selected to compose the SP.  
𝑆ℎ denotes the number of the alternative surveillance setups for hazard h.  
H denotes the number of hazards.   
𝑃ℎ,𝑖,𝑠 denotes the impact parameter (e.g. disease costs, number of human deaths) for hazard h, 
on HII i, for implementing surveillance setup s; 
𝑃ℎ,𝑖
0  denotes the baseline performance for hazard h, on HII i;
 
𝑃ℎ,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  denotes the maximum performance technically possible (or artificially set by the 
relevant expert) for hazard h on HII i;
 
∑ (𝑃ℎ,𝑖
0 − 𝑃ℎ,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥)𝐻ℎ=1  denotes the theoretically maximum portfolio performance on HII i. 
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Step 2. Having obtained the overall performance of the entire SP for each HII i, two 
subjective weightings must be performed: (1) the differences in preference between the 
stakeholders involved, and (2) the differences in importance of the various stakeholders 
viewed by the final decision maker. This ‘double weighting’, as well as the final optimization 
statement, is expressed in (2) to (5):   
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑉 = (𝑤1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐺) × (
𝑤1,1 ⋯ 𝑤1,𝐼
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑤𝐺,1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐺,𝐼
) × (
𝑣1(𝑋)
⋮
𝑣𝐼(𝑋)
)                                                (2)                                                                                                                                                                                                      
s.t. various constraints, such as 
∑ 𝑥ℎ,𝑠
𝑆ℎ
𝑠=1 ≤ 1 for all h,            (3) 
∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑔,ℎ,𝑠𝑥ℎ,𝑠 ≤ 𝐵𝑔
𝑆ℎ
𝑠=1
𝐻
ℎ=1  for all g,           (4) 
𝑥ℎ,𝑠 ∈ (0, 1) for all h, s            (5) 
 
where 
𝑃𝑉 is the overall weighted portfolio performance (OWPP); 
(𝑤1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐺) is the weights the decision maker puts on the various stakeholders 1 to G; 
(
𝑤1,1 ⋯ 𝑤1,𝐼
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑤𝐺,1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐺,𝐼
) are the preference weights stakeholders 1 to G put on HII 1 to I.   
(
𝑣1(𝑋)
⋮
𝑣𝐼(𝑋)
) is the standardized portfolio performance (SPP) on each HII from equation (1);  
𝐵𝑔 denotes the total annual budget available for stakeholder group, g (g=0,1,..,G), to carry out 
the surveillance activities (to simplify the formulation, the decision maker (the FSA) is treated 
as a stakeholder group, g=0).  
𝑐𝑔,ℎ,𝑠 is the annual surveillance costs for stakeholder group g, when, for hazard h, surveillance 
setup s is implemented.  
 
The set of constraints (3) ensure that a maximum of one surveillance setup for each hazard 
will be included in the SP; constraints (4) ensure that the total annual surveillance costs for 
stakeholder group g cannot exceed the annual available surveillance budget; and definitions (5) 
defines 𝑥ℎ,𝑠  as binary variables. Additional constraints can be included to establish more 
complex models according to the specific situation; such as the minimum required 
surveillance performance for some hazards.   
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To derive the weight matrix that reflects shareholders’ preferences, a stakeholder panel, 
analogous to the consumer panel in marketing (e.g., Dynan, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001; 
Booth et al., 2003) will be established to elicit stakeholder preference. 
 
3.5 Quantitative elaboration of the concept of SP optimization 
To illustrate the concept of optimization of a surveillance portfolio, we use a hypothetical 
numerical example. Three different hazards were selected as potential surveillance target 
within the portfolio: classical swine fever (CSF), avian influenza (AI), and salmonella (Sal). 
Impact Parameters for Dutch conditions were assumed taking into account previous studies: 
Mangen et al. (2001) for CSF, Backer et al. (2011) and Koopmans et al. (2003) for AI, and 
Valkenburgh et al. (2007) for Sal respectively. These impact parameters, which mimic the 
results of SHSS analysis, are presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1
Impact parameters, P his , for hazard h , on indicator i , for implementing surveillance setup s as well as weights for indicators and stakeholders
Hazard Impact Indicators P his i=1      i=2 i=3  i=4 C hs
h =1 (CSF)
s =1 P 1,i ,1=P 1
0
12,000 118,000 0 0 200
s =2 P 1,i ,2 10,000 100,000 0 0 5800
s =3 P 1,i ,3 1,000 10,000 0 0 9500
s =4 P 1,i ,4=P 1
max
800 8,000 0 0 28100
h =2 (AI)
s =1 P 2,i ,1=P 2
0
6,200 62,000 10 0.1 200
s =2 P 2,i ,2 6,100 61,000 7 0.08 3,000
s =3 P 2,i ,3 5,800 58,000 6 0.05 10,000
s =4 P 2,i ,4=P 2
max
5,000 50,000 4 0.03 80,000
h =3 (Salmonella)  
s =1 P 3,i ,1=P 3
0
0 10,000 50,000 50 0
s =2 P 3,i ,2 0 7,000 35,000 39 2,000
s =3 P 3,i ,3 0 5,500 20,000 20 30,000
s =4    P 3,i ,4=P 3
max
0 5,000 18,000 15 50,000
Weights on indicators assigned by stakeholders
Farmers   w11=0.4 w12= 0.2 w13= 0.1 w14 = 0.3
Citizens    w21=0.1 w22= 0.1 w23= 0.2 w24 = 0.6
Weights on stakeholders assigned by the decision maker Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Farmers : Citizens w1 : w2=0 : 1 w1 : w2=1 : 0 w1 : w2=0.4 : 0.6
Impact parameters are fictively generated referring to the works of Backer et al. (2011), Koopmans et al. (2003), Mangen et al., (2001), 
Valkenburgh et al., (2007) under the non-vaccination and pre-slaughter control strategy. 
Annual surveillance 
costs for FSA
(k€)
All possible 
surveillance setups 
for each hazard h 
Total annual 
losses  for 
farmers 
(k€) 
Total annual 
losses  for
the society
(k€)  
Total annual cases of 
human infections 
(Person)
Total annual 
cases of human
(Person) 
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Four surveillance setups are included for each hazard. For each, respective surveillance costs 
for an FSA and the impact on disease costs and human health are listed according to the 
framework in Figure 3.2. Table 3.1 lists the weights for each HII and for farmers and citizens.  
 
Step 1: Table 3.2 lists the SPPs, 𝑣𝑖 , of the possible SPs. It is assumed here that one 
surveillance setup must be selected for each hazard, which means there are a total of 64 SPs 
available. For ease of demonstration, only four of these SPs are explicitly shown in Table 3.2.    
 
 
 
Step 2: Through the “double weighing” on 𝑣𝑖, the OWPPs for all 64 possible SPs are obtained 
and graphically depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2
Standardized portfolio performance per indicator 
SP Total annual Total annual Total annual  Total annual Total annual 
 losses  for losses  for cases of human cases of human surveillance costs for 
farmers the society infections Dutch FSA (k€)
(1, 1, 1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 400
(1, 1, 2) 0.0 2.4 46.9 31.4 2,400
(1, 1, 3) 0.0 3.5 93.7 85.5 30,400
... ... ... ... ... ...
(4, 4, 4) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 158,100
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Fig.3.3. The OWPPs with three different sets of decision makers’ weights on two stakeholder 
groups   
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The horizontal axis represents the annual surveillance costs for Dutch FSA to operate the SP 
and the vertical axis represents the OWPPs. Each SP is defined by (1) the annual surveillance 
costs and (2) the OWPPs. Clearly, there is no proportional relationship between the OWPPs 
and the costs, which articulates the need for economic optimization of surveillance resource 
allocation. Figure 3.3A, 3.3B and 3.3C present the results with three different settings of 
decision makers’ (DMs’) weights on farmers and citizens. Two levels of budget constraints 
(X1=36 m€ or X2=100 m€) are considered and only the SPs that expense less than the budget 
are feasible options. Similarly, two minimum performance constraints (Y1= 60% or Y2= 90%) 
are also considered to ensure an acceptable level of OWPP; in other words, only those SPs 
that guarantee the minimum OWPP are feasible.    
 
Figure 3.3A shows the results solely from a citizen’s point of view, where the DMs’ weights 
on farmers and citizens are 0 and 1, respectively. In terms of cost-effectiveness, and taking 
into account only the preference of the citizens, SP-a is to be preferred in case budget 
constraint X1 is considered. An increase of this budget to X2 results in a switch in preference 
to SP-b. A subsequent step could be to treat the cost-effective SPs (that is, SP-a and SP-b) as 
a starting point for cost-efficient analysis. For budget constraint X1, from the cost-efficient 
perspective, SP-d can also be an attractive option because it delivers slightly lower overall 
OWPPs than SP-a but saves on surveillance costs. For budget constraint X2, SP-c is even 
more attractive than SP-b because it saves almost one-third on surveillance costs but still 
ensures almost the same OWPPs as SP-b. Such an analysis has practical implications for DMs 
to efficiently allocate surveillance budgets. Another approach could be to take the minimum 
performance as a constraint. For example, if the minimum required OWPP is Y1, SP-d is the 
cheapest choice to fulfill the requirement, while if the minimum required OWPPs increases to 
Y2, the least expensive SP to fulfill that requirement becomes SP-c.  
 
Conducting the same analysis purely from a farmer’s standpoint (Figure 3.3B) produces 
different results. Considering budget constraint X1, SP-e is preferred over SP-a. Moreover, 
the OWPP under SP-a becomes smaller, indicating that farmers have a lower overall 
preference for this surveillance setup. Similarly, with constraint Y1, SP-f rather than SP-d is 
the cheapest SP for ensuring the minimum performance, while with Y2, SP-g rather than SP-c 
is the cheapest SP. Only with budget constraint X2 do both farmers and citizens prefer SP-b.  
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Figure 3.3C shows the results from a simultaneous viewpoint of both stakeholder groups 
based on the importance judgment of the DMs. The preferred SP-a and SP-b under budget 
constraints X1 and X2 are the same as in Figure 3.3A because the DM assigns a larger weight 
on citizens, which means that their preference is relatively dominant. Moreover, the cheapest 
SP under the minimum performance constraint Y1 is SP-a, which is different from its 
counterparts in Figure 3.3A (SP-d) and 3B (SP-f). The same as in Figure 3.3A, SP-c is the 
cheapest option for satisfying constraint Y2. This compromise-based result provides the 
scientific basis for DMs to make their decisions.  
 
For surveillance organization such as a FSA, it should be realized that the complexity of the 
SP optimization problem increases with (1) the number of hazards, (2) the level of 
surveillance setups for each hazard, and (3) the number of stakeholder groups involved.    
 
3.6 Discussion  
Decision making on hazard surveillance in livestock production chains is a multi-hazard, 
multi-stakeholder, and therefore multi-criteria problem between different surveillance 
alternatives. Therefore, the resource allocation should be tackled from a surveillance portfolio 
(SP) point of view. Currently, a suitable conceptual basis for such a SP is not available. Hence, 
this paper presents such a conceptual approach for the economic optimization of a SP. The 
approach was elaborated from a pure theoretical point of view, with the intention of 
addressing the resource allocation problem for a surveillance organization. 
 
In order to judge whether this approach is a credible tool for economic optimization of a SP, 
two issues should be addressed: (1) the scientific credibility of the concept, and 2) the 
practical use of the approach. 
 
3.6.1 The scientific credibility of the concept 
3.6.1.1 Conceptual validity 
As presented in Fig. 3.2, the concept builds further on the SHSS analysis (Guo et al., 2014) 
with the aim of tackling the multiple hazards surveillance problem. Using the SHSS analysis 
approach, for each SHSS in the SP, an efficient set of surveillance setups can be obtained, 
accompanied by the corresponding TSPP, surveillance costs, and the impact parameters on a 
list of HIIs. The surveillance costs and impact parameters are used as the inputs of a multi-
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criteria portfolio optimization model described in function (2) to derive the optimal SP that 
maximizes the OWPP. The multi-criteria optimization model has been widely applied in the 
area of resource allocation optimization (e.g., Hallerbach et al., 2004; Montibeller et al., 2009; 
Wabiri and Amusa, 2010; Ballestero et al., 2012).   
 
Hence, the concept synchronizes the SHSS analysis approach (Guo et al., 2014) and the 
existing multi-criteria portfolio optimization model. Furthermore, experts
6
 in this field were 
consulted to validate the concept, and concluded it to be relevant and reasonable.     
 
3.6.1.2 Data validity 
The proposed approach requires different types of data, particularly: (1) data for each SHSS 
analysis (that is, the data for hazard spread and expression and the data for impact parameters) 
and 2) the data for weighting different HIIs. The way to derive the data for SHSS analysis was 
described in Guo et al. (2014). Obtaining stakeholders’ preferences to weigh the HIIs is 
important. The stakeholder panel method could be used to elicit stakeholders’ preferences. 
This method can refer to the consumer panel approach, which is predominantly used in the 
marketing field to analyze consumer preference (e.g., Dynan, 2000; Carpenter et al, 2001; 
Booth et al., 2003). Compared to the single-interview approach, the consumer panel approach 
has two advantages: (1) it provides a more accurate measure and (2) it lowers the probability 
of omitting relevant information from analysis (Frank and Strain, 1972). Hence, although 
laborious, varied and valuable data can be obtained to parameterize the models.  
 
3.6.1.3 Operational validity 
An illustrative example was elaborated to reveal the operational validity of the approach. 
Because there is no published research for comparing results, we can only justify the 
operational validity of the approach based on rational reasoning on the observed results in the 
illustrative example. The example shows that the proposed approach can discriminate the 
cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency of different SPs based on the mitigated impacts and the 
corresponding surveillance costs, subject to various practical constraints. Moreover, it has 
also been shown that different stakeholders can have different preferences on the same SP, 
which fulfills the intended purpose of the approach; namely, to show the impact of 
stakeholders’ subjectivity on SP selection.  
                                                 
6
 Experts from the Dutch FSAs (NVWA and PVE), the food company VION, and Central Veterinary Institute 
(CVI) are consulted.   
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Therefore, the operational validity of the approach can be concluded.  
 
3.6.2 The practical use of the approach   
To apply the proposed approach (that is, build the decision support models upon the concept), 
it is essential to have two types of data available. Firstly, the data for the inputs of the SHSS 
simulation models and for the impact parameters on HIIs are required and can be obtained 
using the SHSS analysis approach (Guo et al., 2014). Such data are available for some well-
studied hazards (e.g. CSF, AI, Sal); however, they are difficult to obtain for some less studied 
hazards. Secondly, the data for stakeholders’ preferences is required as the inputs of the multi-
criteria SP optimization model. As mentioned above, the second type of data can be derived 
using the stakeholder panel approach.  
   
Depending on the availability of these data, the approach can be applied on three levels 
accordingly. Firstly, if all required data is available for the hazards in the SP, the full model 
can be completely formulated to optimize the SP in a quantitative way. Secondly, if part or all 
of the data is missing for some hazards in the SP, expert knowledge can be used to estimate 
the missing data so that the approach can still be used in a semi-quantitative way. Thirdly, in 
case the SP consists of so many hazards for which the two types of data are missing, the 
concept of the approach can still be used as a guideline for qualitative reasoning.     
 
In addition to data availability, applying the approach requires extensive use of OR techniques. 
Firstly, the Monte Carlo simulation technique will be applied to derive the TSPPs of different 
surveillance setups in various SHSSs. Secondly, to elicit the stakeholders’ preferences, the 
analytical hierarchy process (Saaty, 2005) and conjoint analysis techniques (e.g., Green and 
Srinivasan, 1990) are required. Thirdly, solving the SP optimization problem with the 
proposed model requires the application of optimization techniques. As shown here, for the 
reasonably small numerical example as presented, it is already laborious to obtain the results 
through numeration approach (Figure 3.3). As the number of hazards involved and the 
associated levels of surveillance setups increases, finding the optimal SP could become 
computationally complex. Therefore, optimization techniques such as linear programming 
should be applied to solve the problem.  
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Finally, in practice, decision makers may not want to express their real preferences on 
different stakeholder groups for political reasons, which could have a huge impact on the final 
selection of SP (see: Figure 3.3). This implies that one must carefully use the obtained 
decision maker’s weights on stakeholders, and sensitivity analysis may be necessary to test 
the sensitivity of the results responding to the decision maker’s weights.   
 
3.6.3 Concluding remarks  
This paper presents a novel approach to improve multi-hazard surveillance assessment. It 
investigates all relevant aspects that must be taken into account when addressing the food 
hazard surveillance problem on the surveillance portfolio level. Although its practicability is 
more restricted by data availability, compared to existing approaches (e.g., Prattley, 2009; 
Häsler et al., 2011), the proposed approach makes the following important improvements: (1) 
it makes conceptual contributions to SP optimization, and (2) it provides a credible basis for 
quantitative modeling. The SP approach proposed here will then be used to optimize a small-
scale SP in a food company, which consists of several SHSSs.    
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Abbreviations
Term Meaning
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process 
AI Avian Influenza
CSF Classical Swine Fever 
DM Decision Maker
FSA Food Safety Authorities 
HII Hazard Impact Indicator 
HRP High Risk Period
OWPP Overall Weighted Portfolio Performance 
Sal Salmonella
SHSS Single Hazard Surveillance System 
SP Surveillance Portfolio 
SPP Standardized portfolio performance 
TSPI Technical surviellance performance indicator
TSPP Technical surviellance performance parameter
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Abstract  
Classical Swine Fever (CSF) is a highly contagious pig disease that causes economic losses 
and impaired animal welfare. Improving the surveillance system for CSF can help to ensure 
early detection of the virus, thereby providing a better initial situation for controlling the 
disease. Economic analysis is required to compare the benefits of improved surveillance with 
the costs of implementing a more intensive system. This paper presents a comprehensive 
economic analysis of CSF surveillance in the Netherlands, taking into account the specialized 
structure of Dutch pig production, differences in virulence of CSF strains, and a complete list 
of possible surveillance activities. The starting point of the analysis is the current Dutch 
surveillance system (i.e. the default surveillance setup), including the surveillance activities 
“daily clinical observation by the farmer”, “veterinarian inspection after a call”, “routine 
veterinarian inspection”, “pathology in AHS”, “PCR on tonsil in AHS”, “PCR on grouped 
animals in CVI”, and “confirmatory PCR by NVWA”. Alternative surveillance setups were 
proposed by adding “routine serology in slaughterhouses”, “routine serology on sow farms” 
and “PCR on rendered animals”. The costs and benefits for applying the alternative 
surveillance setups were evaluated by comparing the annual mitigated economic losses 
because of intensified CSF surveillance with the annual additional surveillance costs.    
 
The results of the cost-effectiveness analysis show that the alternative surveillance setups with 
“PCR on rendered animals” are effective for the moderately virulent CSF strain, whereas the 
surveillance setups with “routine serology in slaughterhouses” or “routine serology on sow 
farms” are effective for the low virulent strain. Moreover, the current CSF surveillance 
system in the Netherlands is cost-effective for both moderately virulent and low virulent CSF 
strains. The results of the cost-benefit analysis for the moderately virulent CSF strain indicate 
that the current surveillance system in the Netherlands is adequate. From an economic 
perspective, there is little to be gained from intensifying surveillance. 
 
Keywords: classical swine fever; surveillance system; cost-effectiveness analysis; stochastic 
simulation modelling    
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4.1 Introduction 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF) is a highly contagious pig disease that causes economic losses 
(Meuwissen et al., 1999; Saatkamp et al, 2000; Moennig, 2000) and impaired animal welfare 
(Mangen, 2002). The Netherlands experienced a large epidemic in 1997-1998, but has since 
been free of CSF. Nevertheless, the risk of CSF introduction remains (Backer et al., 2011). 
Two key factors which determine the impacts of a CSF epidemic are the early detection and 
rapid eradication of the disease. These factors are influenced by the quality of the surveillance 
system or programme and the effectiveness of the control strategy, respectively. The main 
aim of pre-epidemic surveillance is therefore to achieve early detection; more specifically, it 
is to minimize the duration of the High Risk Period (HRP) and the number of infected farms 
at the end of this period (Klinkenberg et al., 2005; Guo et al., 2014). An analysis of CSF 
surveillance should focus on these two performance parameters. Moreover, resources 
available to support government veterinary services are becoming more and more limited in 
many countries worldwide (Stärk et al., 2006), including the Netherlands (i.e. Dutch Food 
safety authorities faces an increased pressure on optimally allocating their surveillance 
resource due to budget cut). Therefore, an analysis should also address the economic aspects 
of surveillance, such as the cost of surveillance activities and the potential economic benefits 
provided by improved surveillance. The importance of incorporating economic aspects in the 
evaluation of surveillance has been addressed by Drewe et al. (2012), Häsler (2011) and 
Häsler et al. (2011). A few studies have incorporated economic aspects in the evaluation of 
surveillance systems; these studies generally use cost-effectiveness as the economic 
evaluation method. Prattley et al. (2007) developed a model for the cost-effective evaluation 
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance.  The authors claimed that the 
model could be used as a standard tool to evaluate and compare alternative BSE surveillance 
strategies. Hadorn et al. (2009) conducted a cost-effective evaluation of bluetongue 
surveillance in Switzerland using scenario tree modelling. They concluded that an improved 
passive clinical surveillance in cattle and sheep combined with a targeted bulk milk testing 
strategy in high-risk dairy cattle herds should be implemented. Häsler et al. (2012) conducted 
an economic evaluation of the surveillance and intervention program for bluetongue virus 
serotype 8 in Switzerland. The authors concluded that the programs were economically 
beneficial in the period of 2008-2009, and not beneficial in 2010-2012. The reason for the 
“unbeneficial situation” in 2010-2012 is that the average intervention costs are kept the same 
as in period 2008-2009, while the mean total benefits are reduced in 2010–2012 due to the 
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reduced occurrence of disease in a fully vaccinated population. For CSF surveillance, only 
Klinkenberg et al. (2005) included an economic evaluation (cost-effectiveness analysis).  
     
Aspects of CSF surveillance in the Netherlands have been studied several times, and can be 
categorized into ex post analysis (i.e. statistical analysis of past epidemics) and ex ante 
analysis (i.e. simulation studies of choice options). Crauwels et al. (1999) and Elbers et al. 
(2002) both conducted ex post analyses of the 1997-1998 Dutch CSF epidemic. Crauwels et al. 
(1999) concluded that routine serological tests would not have shortened the HRP during this 
epidemic; Elbers et al. (2002) found a significant effect of clinical-sign-based surveillance on 
the early detection of CSF. The studies of Klinkenberg et al. (2005) and Backer et al. (2011) 
are ex ante studies. Klinkenberg et al. (2005) investigated the cost-effectiveness of the current 
Dutch CSF surveillance system using the Monte Carlo simulation technique. They concluded 
that the current system are capable of preventing very expensive epidemics with high 
probability. They also found that excluding the four-weekly veterinarian inspection increased 
the median of the HRP from 35 days to 36 days. Backer et al. (2011) analysed the potential 
use of additional PCR testing of rendering animals as a surveillance activity to ensure early 
detection of CSF. The authors estimated a two-day gain in detection time and concluded that 
this was too small to demonstrate a substantial effect of the new early detection system based 
on mortality data, considering the variation in outcome and the uncertainty in some model 
assumptions. However, the authors also stated that the new activity might be useful in long 
CSF-free periods, when farmers and veterinarians tend to become less aware of CSF. These 
Dutch studies are accompanied by studies in other European countries, particularly with 
regard to demonstration of CSF-freedom (Feliziani, et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2007; Boklund 
et al., 2013), Monte Carlo simulations (Karsten et al., 2005ab), syndromic surveillance 
(Raulo and Lyytikainen, 2007), and CSF awareness and risk-based surveillance (Dürr et al., 
2013).   
 
These studies have made important contributions to the body of knowledge on CSF 
surveillance in the Netherlands. However, they all lack one or more of the following aspects: 
specialized structure of Dutch pig production chain,  coverage of different surveillance 
activities, consideration of different virulent strains, a cost-benefit analysis, and/or trade-offs 
between surveillance performance and costs from a national decision making point of view. 
The current paper attempts to address these limitations. With a special attention to the 
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economic aspect of CSF surveillance in the Netherlands, we compared different surveillance 
setups consisting of most surveillance system components (SSCs) available by cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis based on the general principles proposed by Häsler 
(2011) and Häsler et al. (2011). We considered a more specific structure of Dutch pig 
production chain (compared to previous studies), and considered two different virulence 
stains for evaluating CSF surveillance in a Dutch setting. We also derived new managerial 
insights from the modelling results which can support the decision making of Dutch 
Government concerning CSF surveillance.  
  
4.2 Materials and methods  
4.2.1. General model features  
In this paper, the following terms and definitions are used, as defined in Guo et al. (2014): 
 A single-hazard surveillance system (SHSS) is a surveillance system that aims to detect a 
single microbiological or chemical hazard in a livestock production chain, such as CSF or 
Salmonella surveillance. 
 A surveillance system component (SSC) is a specific surveillance activity within a SHSS; 
for example, clinical diagnosis and routine serological tests in slaughterhouses (hence, 
each SHSS consists of one or more SSCs). 
 A surveillance setup of a SHSS is the combination of SSCs with their respective levels of 
intensity, e.g., sampling frequency and size; 
 
The simulation model is stochastic and dynamic, and captures the specialized structure of the 
Dutch pig production chain by distinguishing three different types of farms: farrowing, 
finishing and farrow-to-finish. In Figure 4.1, the interrelations between the different farm 
types are presented.   
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Fig. 4.1. The simplified Dutch pig production chain. The dotted lines are used to denote the flows of 
sows to the slaughterhouses, which are disregarded in the model because of the low submission rate.     
  
Specific breeding farms were not included because their number is relatively small and they 
have a high level of bio-security. Standard surveillance of CSF on these breeding farms is 
likely to have little impact on both the technical performance and the total surveillance costs 
of the surveillance system, and therefore on the choice of the surveillance setup.  Dotted lines 
are used to denote the flow of sows to the slaughterhouses, which are disregarded in the 
model because of the low submission rate.      
 
A simplified distribution of animals and farm types is presented in Table 4.1, which is 
estimated from a dataset of Dutch pig farms in 2010 provided by Dutch Animal Health 
Service (GD) together with expert opinions. It combines the data in the Dutch Farm 
Registration System (BRBS) and in the Dutch Identification and Registration (I&R) system, 
including unique farm identifiers, farm classes, and the number of animals per farm type for 
the year 2010 (Hop et al., 2014). 
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The numbers of animals per farm in Table 4.1 are the averages estimated from that dataset, 
and there exists a large variation in the farm sizes (i.e. farms containing from only several 
animals to above 10000 animals). Using the averages of animals is a simplification of the 
reality. However, compared to the previous studies (e.g., Crauwels et al., 1999; Klinkenberg 
et al., 2005) which considered one type of homogeneous animals, the assumed structure of 
Dutch pig production chain in our work is already closer to the real life situation. Moreover, 
incorporating the variation in farm sizes will significantly increase the complexity of the 
simulation model, thus we decided to use the average numbers of animals on the farms.    
      
The main structure of the model is presented in Figure 4.2 and consists of four linked modules.  
 
Initialization 
module 
Hazard dynamics 
module
Surveillance 
module
Data analysis 
module
 
Fig. 4.2. The main structure of the CSF surveillance simulation model  
Table 4.1
The distribution of farms and animals (averages) estimated from the  
Dutch pig farm database 2010 provided by the Animal Health Service 
Farm type Number of farms
Piglet Sow Hog
Farrowing 2300 2000 400 0
Finishing 5000 0 0 830
Farrow-to-finish 360 1090 220 800
Number of animals
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The Initialization module loads and initializes different sets of input parameters and matrices 
(for more details see Figure A17 in the Supporting Information). The CSF dynamics module 
simulates the development of CSF in the Dutch pig population at three interrelated levels: (1) 
CSF symptoms (i.e. the symptoms in diseased animals) within individual animals, (2) disease 
spread between animals within farms and (3) disease spread between farms. Parallel to this, 
the surveillance module simulates the daily surveillance activities in the pig population. 
Finally, the simulated and stored data are analysed in the data analysis module (for more 
details see Figure A18 in the Supporting Information).  
 
4.2.2.  Classical swine fever dynamics and surveillance modules 
In Figure 4.3, an outline of the hazard dynamic and surveillance modules (i.e. the core of the 
CSF surveillance simulation model) is presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Day:=Day+1
Has CSF already 
been introduced to 
the country?
Update the  
population  
matrix
Retrieve the 
CSF expression-
probability 
matrix
Development of CSF 
symptoms within 
individual animals
Sampling 
Development of disease 
spread between animals 
within a farm
Yes
Is CSF 
Introduced 
today ?
No
Yes
Development of 
disease spread 
between farms
 1st SSC 
2nd SSC 
CSF 
suspicion ?  Store the costs
 
Store the costs
Confirmatory 
SSC 
 Store the costsConfirmation 
of CSF?
No
  Has CSF 
already been 
detected?
No
Hazard store 
CSF 
suspicion ?
No
No
Stop hazard 
dynamic 
simulation
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Day:=Day+i
Day:=Day+m
Day:=Day+n
Stop hazard 
simulation
Yes
In the same day
Cost store
Update the  
population 
matrix
No
Analysis
The population matrix
Initialization
 
Fig. 4.3. The outline of the hazard dynamic and surveillance modules (i.e. the core of the CSF surveillance simulation model). The dotted line indicates that 
the hazard dynamics simulation stops in the same day of hazard detection. 
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After initialization, the population matrix is updated each day. This matrix describes the 
distribution of animals with symptoms on farms in the Netherlands, which includes (1) the 
number of infected farms in the country, (2) the number of infected animals on the infected 
farms, and 3) the number of infected animals with certain symptoms on the infected farms. 
Prior to CSF introduction, updating is done using the daily probabilities of showing 
background symptoms for individuals animals (see Table 4.2). 
 
 
 
The background symptoms are symptoms similar to those caused by CSF, but which are 
attributable to hazards other than CSF. These are included to model ‘false positive animals’ in 
the CSF-free period. For clinical symptoms, the probabilities for individual animals were 
estimated by comparing the model results for the number of false positives per year, to the 
historical data confirmed by expert opinions, because of the lack of literature data. The 
mortality was derived from a database of all commercial pig enterprises in the Netherlands in 
the period 2001–2005, estimated from Backer et al. (2011) combined with expert opinions.  
 
An annual default probability of CSF introduction of 0.06 was used (De Vos et al., 2004), 
which means that on average around one outbreak in 16 years is expected. The index farm 
was randomly selected, and each infection started with three infected animals. In the default 
situation, a moderately virulent strain was assumed.   
 
After CSF introduction, the model uses the CSF symptom matrices for piglets, slaughter pigs 
and sows to update the population matrix. The complete CSF symptom matrices can be found 
in Table A1 and Table A2 in the Supporting Information. In Table 4.3, a simplified version is 
presented for explanation purposes.    
Table 4.2
Daily probability of showing the background symptoms and mortalities for individual animals in the CSF-free period
symptoms
Piglets Slaughter pigs and sows    
Non-specific clinical symptoms* 0.01 0.0025
Suspicious clinical symptoms* 0.0003 0.0001
Mortalities** 0.0016 0.0002
*The probabilities of clinical symptoms were estimated by comparing the model results for the number of  
false positives per year to the historical data confirmed by expert opinions. 
**The mortalities in the CSF-free period were derived from a database of all commercial pig enterprises in
the Netherlands in the period 2001–2005, estimated from Backer et al. (2011) combined with expert opinions. 
Daily probabilities of showing the background symptoms and mortalities  
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The first column of Table 4.3 is a generic list of possible symptoms. The symptoms are 
categorized into clinical symptoms and pathological findings. The clinical symptoms are 
further classified as non-specific clinical symptoms and suspicious clinical symptoms; the 
pathological findings are either in blood or in organs. The numbers are the time-dependent 
probabilities for individual animals to show CSF-related symptoms after a certain day post 
infection. For example, an individual piglet has a probability of 0.5 to have fever nine days 
after infection has occurred.  To save computational space, we assume clinical symptoms and 
pathologies in organs occur hierarchically. 
 
The infected animals on the index farm are the first to develop these symptoms. After a period 
of four to six days, the infected animals develop viraemia and become infectious to other 
Table 4.3
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for individual piglets infected by moderately virulent CSF    
symptoms
0 1 ... 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... 28 References
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 ... 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 ... 0 a,  h , c, d, k
Apathy 0 0 ... 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 ... 0 c, d, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 ... 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.38 ... 0 c, d, k 
Respiratory disease 0 0 ... 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.37 ... 0 k
Constipation 0 0 ... 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.36 ... 0 c, d, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 ... 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 ... 0 a, c, k
Death 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... 0 c, d, e, b, k 
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 ... 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.31 ... 0 a, c, f, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 ... 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 ... 0 a , c, e, f, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 ... 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 ... 0 a , f, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 ... 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.28 ... 0 c, d, f, k
Pathological findings ... ...
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 ... 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 0 c, d, g, k
Antibodies 0 0 ... 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 ... 1 j, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.27 ... 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.24 ... 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.21 ... 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.18 ... 0 k
a
Ribbens (2009)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
c
Dewulf et al. (2001a)
d
Laevens et al. (1999)
e
Uttenthal et al. (2003)
f
Klinkerberg et al. (2005)
g
Dewulf et al. (2001b)
h
Weesendorp et al. (2009b)
j
Colijn et al. (1997)
k
expert opinion
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for infected individuals  
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animals (Leavens et al., 1998; Laevens et al., 1999; Dewulf et al., 2001ab; Klinkenberg et al., 
2002), which is the start of disease transmission within the farm. A classical Susceptible-
Infected-Recovered (SIR) model was applied to simulate this within-farm transmission:  
𝐶(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑆(𝑡)
𝛽𝑤𝐼(𝑡)
𝑁
                                                                                                               (1)                                                                                                                         
where, 
𝐶(𝑡 + 1) is the number of newly infected animals at day t+1, 
𝑆(𝑡) is the number of susceptible animals at day t,   
𝐼(𝑡) is the number of infectious animals at day t, 
N is the number of animals on farm, 
βw is the within-farm transmission parameter with a value of 0.21 day
-1
 (Klinkenberg et al., 
2005).  
 
Accumulation of infectious animals results in between-farm disease spread in many cases. A 
variant of the SIR model (see for example, Thrusfield et al., 2013 and Klinkenberg et al., 
2003) was used to explicitly link the infectivity of an infected farm to the number of 
infectious animals on that farm, to enable more realistic modelling of between-farm CSF 
transmission. In the modified SIR model, an infected farm infects a susceptible farm through 
a Poisson process with rate, 𝛽𝑏𝐼(𝑡). Parameter 𝛽𝑏  is the between-farm transmission parameter 
(per infectious animal per day). 𝐼(𝑡)  is the number of infectious animals on the source 
infected farm at day t. Through this method, it is explicitly modelled that the between-farm 
transmission rate,  𝛽𝑏𝐼(𝑡) , for a source infected farm is proportional to the number of 
infectious animals on it.    
 
This between–farm transmission process distinguishes between transmission caused by 
transport contacts and transmission from indirect contacts. Transport contacts are associated 
with piglet transportation, and this type of transmission can therefore only occur from 
farrowing farms to finishing farms, whereas the indirect contact transmissions exist between 
all types of farms. The values of the transmission parameters for transport contacts (𝛽𝑏1) and 
indirect contacts (𝛽𝑏2) were 0.0029 and 0.0024 per infectious animal per day respectively, 
based on Klinkenberg et al. (2005).   
 
In the surveillance module, each surveillance setup consists of various SSCs which were 
combined in different surveillance pathways following defined protocols. SSCs were operated 
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to sample the population matrix on a daily base. An example of a potential surveillance 
pathway is shown in Figure 4.3. The first SSC could be ‘daily clinical observations by the 
farmer’. If the farmer suspects a CSF infection, he could trigger the second SSC, ‘veterinarian 
inspection’, by making a phone call. If the veterinarian also suspects a CSF infection, then the 
third SSC, ‘confirmatory PCR’, is initiated to conduct confirmatory PCR tests. This 
surveillance pathway is for demonstration purposes. In the actual model, multiple surveillance 
pathways with different SSCs exist simultaneously in a specific surveillance setup. 
 
Each simulated CSF epidemic is stopped at the day of CSF notification. The time it takes to 
apply each SSC is recorded and the final day of the hazard simulation is consistent with the 
day of CSF notification (indicated by the dotted line in Figure 4.3). The model also stores the 
surveillance costs incurred by each SSC. Table 4.4 presents a comprehensive list of SSCs that 
are used in the Dutch CSF surveillance system or which could be implemented in the future.    
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Table 4.4
Inventory of SSCs that could be used to detect CSF in the Netherlands
SSCs Sensitivities Application frequency/threshold Time Sampling size Cost
1) Daily clinical observation by the To call a veterinarian: Once every day
b,c
On the same day of All animals
b,c
no
farmer
a
20% to 100%
b,c
observation
b,c
To submit an animal to AHS
d
: 1 day after observation
b,c 
20% to 100%
b,c 
2) Veterinarian inspection after a call
a
32%
b,c 
(3.2% in CSF-free period
j
) After a call from the farmer
b,c
1 day after the phone call
b,c
All animals
b,c 70€ /timeb
3) Routine veterinarian inspection
a
32%
b,c 
(3.2% in CSF-free period
j
) Once per four weeks
b,c
All animals
b,c 1175€ /herd/yearb
4) Pathology in AHS
a,d
50%
b,c 
After the submission of The same day of 1 severely diseased animal
b,c 400€ /animalb 
a severely diseased animal
b,c
submission
b,c
5) PCR on tonsil in AHS
a,d
98%
c
In case of a CSF suspicion
c,e 
Result available in the 1 tonsil sample
c,e 42€ /teste
same day of pathology
c,e
no CSF suspicion
c,e 
Result available 2 days  1 tonsil sample
c.e 42€ /teste
after pathology
c,e 
6) PCR on grouped animals in CVI
a,f
98%
c 
(PCR) In case more than 40 2 days
c
6 animals with non-specific 188.56€ /submissionb,e
77%
g 
(veterinarian) animals show non-specific clinical symtoms
e
clinical symptoms
c  
7) Confirmatory PCR by NVWA
a,b 
98%
c
 (PCR) In case of a CSF suspicion
e 
1 day
c
5 blood samples
c 1574€ /caseb,e
77%
g
 (veterinarian)
8) Routine serology in slaughterhouses
i  
94%
e  
One batch every 10 days
e
12 days
e
5 samples per batch
j 11.30€ /samplee 
9) PCR on rendered animals
i  
98%
c 
For farrowing and farrow-to-finish 2 days
c
All dead animals
c 32€ /teste
farms: 6 dead animals
j 
 10€ /submissione 
For finishing farms: 3 dead animals
j 7.26€ /animalb
10) Routine serology on sow farms
i
94%
e 
4 weeks
e
12 days
e
12 samples
e 18,56€ /samplee 
a
SSCs in the current Dutch CSF surveillance system (default)
b
Klinkenberg et al. (2005)     
c
Backer et al. (2011)
d
Animal Health Service
e
Expert opinion
f
The Central Veterinarian Institute  
g
Bouma et al. (2001)
h
Dutch Food Safety Authority
i
SSCs not currently used in the Netherlands. These are alternative SSCs that could be implemented in the future. 
j
Assumption
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4.2.3. The selection of surveillance setup  
The surveillance setups that were investigated in the model are shown in Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.5
The surveillance-setup scenarios that are compared in the analysis 
SSCs D
1
D+S12
2
D+R6,3
3
D+SL5
4
D+S24
5
D+R6,3+S12
6
D+SL5+S12
7
D+SL5+R6,3
8
D+SL10
9
D+S36
10
D+SL5+R6,3+S12
11
D+SL15
12
D+R6,1
13
D+R1,1
14
Daily clinical observation by the farmer X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Veterinarian inspection after a call X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Routine veterinarian inspection   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Pathology in AHS X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PCR on tonsil in AHS X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PCR on grouped animals in CVI X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Confirmatory PCR by NVWA X X X X X X X X
Routine serology in slaughterhouses X X X X X X
PCR on rendered animals X X X X X X
Routine serology on sow farms X X X X X X
D: defaut surveillance-setup scenario; S: routine serology on sow farms; SL: routine serology in slaughterhouses; R: PCR on rendered animals   
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The first one was the default Dutch CSF surveillance setup (denoted as D) which includes the 
SSCs, “daily clinical observation by the farmer”, “veterinarian inspection after a call”, 
“routine veterinarian inspection”, “pathology in AHS”, “PCR on tonsil in AHS”, “PCR on 
grouped animals in CVI”, and “confirmatory PCR by NVWA”. The default surveillance setup 
provided a baseline for further comparison. Other setups were created by adding one or more 
of three alternative SSCs, which were not part of the current Dutch surveillance system. These 
three SSCs were “routine serology in slaughterhouses” (SL), “routine serology on sow farms” 
(S) and “PCR on rendered animals” (R). The sampling intensity for ‘routine serology in 
slaughterhouse’ (SL5) was five animals per batch per ten days. For ‘routine serology on sow 
farms’ (S12), the intensity was 12 blood samples per farm per four weeks. For ‘PCR on 
rendered animals’ (R6,3) the intensity was a submission threshold of six dead animals in a day 
for farrowing and farrow-to-finish farms, and three dead animals for finishing farms. Lastly, 
six setups were created by increasing the sampling intensity for the alternative SSCs. For 
“routine serology in slaughterhouses” the sample size was increased to ten (SL10) or 15 (SL15) 
animals per batch per ten days. For ‘routine serology on sow farms’ the sample size was 
increased to 24 (S24) or 36 (S36) blood samples per farm per four weeks. For PCR on rendered 
animals, the submission threshold was lowered to one dead animal per day for finishing farms 
(R6,1), or to one dead animal per day for all types of farms (R1,1).  
 
In total, there were 14 surveillance setups to be analysed. For each surveillance setup, a 
simulation was run with 1,000 iterations.  The outputs of interest were the annual surveillance 
costs and the two technical performance parameters, duration of the HRP and number of 
farms infected at the end of the HRP. An efficient set of surveillance setups was then derived 
using these outputs.  
 
4.2.4. The low virulent strain case 
CSF strains can differ in virulence. In this paper, the default CSF strain is assumed to be 
moderately virulent. To explore the effect of differences in virulence on the efficient set of 
surveillance setups, a low virulent strain was also investigated. The probabilities in the 
symptom matrices (see Table A3 and A4 in the Supporting Information) and the parameters 
for within-farm and between-farm transmission were adapted for the low virulent strain. The 
probabilities were changed so that the symptoms occurred later and with lower probability, 
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relative to the moderately virulent strain. The within-farm and between-farm transmission 
parameters (βw and βb) were changed to half of their values, relative to the moderately virulent 
strain because literature shows that the spread of low virulent CSF is relatively slow 
compared to the moderately virulent CSF (Terpstra,1987; Weesendorp et al., 2009b) . 
 
4.2.5.  Economic analysis 
The efficient set of surveillance setups was derived using Pareto efficiency analysis (see for 
example, Ben-Israel et al., 1977; Yoo and Harman, 2007; Ho et al., 2010). Surveillance setups 
included in the efficient set should fulfil the following mathematical conditions: 
s
*
 is an efficient surveillance setup, if there is no other setup s, among the setups evaluated, 
such that  
C(s) ≤ C(s*) (the annual surveillance costs) 
and 
P(s) ≤ P(s*) (duration of HRP or the number of infected farms at the end of HRP) 
with at least one strict inequality (Ben-Israel et al., 1977), 
 
Häsler (2011) suggested that, when possible, cost-benefit analysis is preferred because cost-
effectiveness analysis does not quantify the benefits of the surveillance setups. Therefore, a 
cost-benefit analysis was conducted for the efficient set of surveillance setups. The results of 
CSF impact simulation model for the Netherlands, described by Hop et al. (2014), was used to 
estimate the direct costs (DC) and direct consequential costs (DCC) of a CSF epidemic, using 
the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP as the input. The DC include those related 
to organising the disease, clinical examination and serological screening, depopulation and 
feed destruction; the DCC include those due to welfare problems, empty stables (idle 
production factors), and movement restrictions (Hop et al., 2014). Previous studies (Berentsen, 
et al., 1992; Saatkamp et al, 2000; Mahul and Durand, 2000; Asseldonk et al., 2005; 
Longworth et al., 2012ab) have shown that for countries exporting more than 50 percent of 
their domestic production (i.e. the production within a country), the indirect consequential 
costs (ICC) due to the losses of exports can be larger than the DC and DCC. Hereby, the ICC 
are assumed three times the DC and DCC using Danish situation as a reference (Boklund et al. 
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2009). This assumption actually overestimates the ICC in Dutch situation, because Denmark 
exports a larger proportion of pigs than the Netherlands. However, as we will see later, this 
overestimation will not affect the conclusion drawn from this work. Since the CSF impact 
simulation model only considers a moderately virulent strain, it was only possible to do a 
cost-benefit analysis for the efficient surveillance setups for the moderately virulent strain. 
The number of infected farms at the end of the HRP for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles 
(as shown in Figure 4.4) for each efficient surveillance setup was used as input for the CSF 
impact simulation model (Hop et al., 2014). The impact simulation model was run using this 
input to obtain a distribution of the estimated costs (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles) 
associated with an epidemic characterized by that number of farms at the end of the HRP. 
Then, the reduced costs, compared to the default surveillance setup (baseline), for 
implementing the alternative efficient surveillance setups can be obtained. These reduced 
costs are the benefits derived from more intensive surveillance and earlier detection of CSF. 
The annual benefits from intensified surveillance were obtained by multiplying the benefits 
by the default annual CSF introduction probability of 0.06 (De Vos et al., 2004).  
 
4.2.6.  Sensitivity analysis  
Sensitivity analysis was conducted for the CSF surveillance simulation model, for both the 
moderately virulent and low virulent CSF strains. The sensitivity analysis focused on the 
factors that were expected to have a large impact on the results. These factors were: the values 
of the within-farm and between-farm transmission parameters, the speed and severity of 
symptom developments in the diseased animals (by modifying the CSF symptom matrices), 
and the sensitivities of the ELISA and PCR tests.  
 
The sensitivity of the benefits to the annual introduction probability was also investigated. 
Four alternative annual introduction probabilities of 0.01, 0.03, 0.1 and 0.2 were assumed,  
 
4.3 Results   
4.3.1. Moderately virulent strain    
For each surveillance setup, the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the duration of the HRP 
(Figure 4.4a), and the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP (Figure 4.4b), are 
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presented with their corresponding annual surveillance cost. A square is used to denote the 
median for the efficient surveillance setups; otherwise the median is denoted with a triangle.  
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Fig. 4.4 The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP (Figure 4.4a) and the number of the infected farms at 
the end of the HRP (Figure 4.4b) for 14 surveillance setups  with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
 
The median of the duration of the HRP under the default surveillance setup, D, was 38 days 
(with eight infected farms), and the 10th and 90th percentiles values were 24 days (with two 
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infected farms) and 47 days (with 17 infected farms) respectively (see surveillance setup 1 in 
Figure 4.4). Adding the SSC ‘routine serology on sow farms’ to the default surveillance setup, 
D+S12 , did not have an impact on the duration of the HRP but resulted in an extra €7.5 
million annual surveillance costs (see surveillance setup 2 in Figure 4.4). Even after 
intensifying the routine serology on sow farms, setups D+S24 and D+S36, the median duration 
of the HRP was not affected (see surveillance setup 5 and 10 in Figure 4.4). Similarly, adding 
the SSC ‘routine serology in slaughterhouses’, D+SL5, had little effect on the median duration 
of the HRP even when the sampling was intensified (see surveillance setup 4, 9 and 12 in 
Figure 4.4).  Adding the SSC, ‘PCR on rendered animals’, to the default surveillance setup, 
D+R6,3, reduced the median duration of the HRP by two days (36 days with seven infected 
farms) and increased the annual surveillance costs by €10.5 million (see surveillance setup 3 
in Figure 4.4). Intensifying the SSC “PCR on rendered animals” to D+R6,1, shortens the 
median duration of the HRP to 27 days with two infected farms (see surveillance setup 13 in 
Figure 4.4).  
 
In this way, for each surveillance setup, the HRP and the annual surveillance costs are plotted. 
Based on the median of the duration of the HRP and the annual surveillance costs, a set of 
efficient surveillance setup for the moderately virulent strain were obtained: D, D+R6,3, and 
D+R6,1 (see surveillance setup 1, 3 and 13  in Figure 4.4a). The two alternative efficient 
surveillance setups both contained the SSC “PCR on rendered animals”, but no other 
additional SSCs.  
 
4.3.2.  Low virulent strain   
A similar procedure was followed for the low virulent strain; the results are presented in 
Figure 4.5.  
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Fig. 4.5. The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP (Figure 4.5a) and the number of the infected farms at 
the end of the HRP (Figure 4.5b) for 14 surveillance setups  with the low virulent strain. 
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setup with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated.  
 
The median duration of the HRP under the default surveillance setup, D, was 133 days (with 
11 infected farms), and the 10th and 90th percentiles were 69 days (with four infected farms) 
and 228 days (with 25 infected farms) respectively (see surveillance setups 1 in Figure 4.5). 
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The efficient set of surveillance setups for the low virulent CSF strain changed to: D, D+S12, 
D+SL5, D+SL5+S12, D+SL10, D+SL15 (see surveillance setups 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 12 in Figure 4.5a). 
All of the five alternative efficient surveillance setups contained serological SSCs.  
       
4.3.3.    Cost-benefit analysis for the moderately virulent strain 
Table 4.6 shows the detailed comparisons between the additional annual surveillance costs 
and the annual benefits for each alternative efficient surveillance setup, for the five annual 
CSF introduction probabilities.  
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Table 4.6
Cost-benefit analysis for the efficient surveillance-setup scenarios with the moderately virulent strain 
Alternative efficient Additional annual
surveillance-setup  surveillance costs(M€)
scenarios
 
10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90%
Annual introduction 
probability: 0.01 
D+R6,3 11 0 0 0 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.16
D+R6,1 34 0 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.68 0.56 0.88 0.96
Annual introduction 
probability: 0.03
D+R6,3 11 0 0 0 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.60 0.48
D+R6,1 34 0 0.36 0.72 0.60 0.96 2.04 1.68 2.64 2.88
Annual introduction 
probability: 0.06 (default) 
D+R6,3 11 0 0 0 0.24 0.24 0.48 0.54 1.20 0.96
D+R6,1 34 0 0.72 1.44 1.20 1.92 4.08 3.36 5.28 5.76
Annual introduction 
probability: 0.1
D+R6,3 11 0 0 0 0.40 0.40 0.80 0.90 2.00 1.60
D+R6,1 34 0 1.20 2.40 2.00 3.20 6.80 5.60 8.80 9.60
Annual introduction 
probability: 0.2
D+R6,3 11 0 0 0 0.80 0.80 1.60 1.80 4.00 3.20
D+R6,1 34 0 2.40 4.80 4.00 6.40 13.60 11.20 17.60 19.20
the number of infected farms at the end   the number of infected farms at the end the number of infected farms at the end  
of HRP under the surveillance-setup scenario of HRP under the surveillance-setup scenario  of HRP under the surveillance setup scenario
Annual benefits Annual benefits Annual benefits
  (M€) on the 10th  perencile of   (M€) on the 50th  perencile of   (M€)  on  the 90th  perencile of 
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The additional annual surveillance costs were €11 million and €34 million respectively for 
setups D+R6,3 and D+R6,1 (see surveillance setups 3 and 13 in Figure 4.4a). The 10th, 50th, 
and 90th percentiles of annual benefits from the intensified surveillance setups are presented 
for each of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the number of infected farms at the end of 
the HRP (see Table 4.7).  
 
 
 
It is shown that the additional annual surveillance costs for both setups were much larger than 
the annual benefits from intensified surveillance. This result was valid for all five scenarios of 
surveillance setups regarding the probability of CSF introduction.  
 
4.3.4.    Sensitivity analysis 
For the CSF surveillance simulation model, the parametric changes either shortened or 
lengthened the durations of the HRP and the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP 
for all surveillance setups following the same pattern. The efficient set of surveillance setups 
remained the same across all parameter changes (to save space, those results are presented as 
the Supporting Information). For the cost-benefit analysis, the higher annual CSF introduction 
probabilities (than 0.06) did not reverse the relationship between the benefits and additional 
surveillance costs (see Table 4.6). 
  
4.4 Discussion  
4.4.1. Content of this study 
This study extends the current body of Dutch CSF surveillance literature (Crauwels et al., 
1999; Elbers et al., 2002; Klinkenberg et al., 2005; Backer et al., 2011), in three specific areas: 
it includes most of the potential SSCs, it considers different virulent strains, and the study 
includes an in-depth cost-effectiveness analysis and cost benefit analysis where possible.    
 
Table 4.7
The number of infected farms at the end of the HRP for each efficient surveillance-setup scenario with the moderately virulent strain
Efficient surveillance- Annual surveillance costs
setup scenarios (M€)
10% 50% 90%
D 11 2 8 17
D+R6,3 22 2 7 15
D+R6,1 45 1 2 6
Percentiles of the number of infected farms at 
the end of the HRP
98 
 
For the moderately virulent strain, the surveillance setups including the SSCs ‘routine 
serology in slaughterhouses’ and ‘routine serology on sow farms’ had minimal impact on the 
duration of the HRP and the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP. This finding can 
be explained by the fact that clinical symptoms occur much earlier than antibodies in the 
blood. The finding is consistent with the claim of Crauwels et al. (1999) that routine 
serological screening would not have shortened the duration of the HRP during the 1997-1998 
CSF epidemic. The SSC ‘PCR on rendered animals’ had impact on the reduction of the 
duration of the HRP and the number of infected farms at the end of the HRP. CSF greatly 
increases the mortality of infected animals, and conducting PCR tests on dead animals can 
therefore substantially increase the probability of detecting CSF. Both of the alternative 
efficient surveillance setups (D+R6,3 and D+R6,1) contained the SSC ‘PCR on rendered 
animals’. This finding is consistent with the result in Backer et al. (2011) that ‘PCR on 
rendered animals’ can reduce the duration of HRP.      
 
The analysis of the efficient set of surveillance setups for the moderately virulent CSF was 
extended by including a cost-benefit analysis. For the two alternative efficient surveillance-
setups, the results of CSF impact simulation model of Hop et al. (2014) was used to calculate 
the DC and DCC of a CSF epidemic, and an overestimated ICC, based on Danish situation, 
was assumed. The results show that the costs of intensified surveillance were much larger 
than the benefits for both these surveillance setups even with the overestimated ICC caused 
by a CSF outbreak. One point should be addressed here is that in this study, only the financial 
impact of CSF surveillance is considered. CSF also causes other impacts (e.g. socio-ethical 
impacts) which could be reduced by intensifying the CSF surveillance system. These aspects 
are not considered in this study. From an economic perspective, intensifying the Dutch CSF 
surveillance system for detecting the moderately virulent CSF is not preferable.           
 
In contrast to the findings for the moderately virulent strain, the surveillance setups containing 
routine serology SSCs were highly effective for the low virulent CSF strain. Animals infected 
with low virulent CSF are slow to develop clinical symptoms and these symptoms are often 
more obscure, which makes clinical inspection ineffective. Since routine serological tests do 
not rely on clinical inspections, they have a positive effect on the early detection of low 
virulent CSF. Incorporating the SSC ‘PCR on rendered animals’ had a negligible impact on 
the duration of the HRP and the number of infected farms at the end of HRP. This is expected, 
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since infection with low virulent CSF does not increase the mortality of animals. Hence, 
conducting PCR on rendered animals does not enhance the probability of CSF detection, 
compared with PCR testing on randomly sampled animals. All of the alternative efficient 
surveillance setups contained routine serology SSCs.   
 
A cost-benefit analysis for the low virulent CSF scenario was not conducted for two reasons. 
Firstly, re-parameterizing the CSF simulation model (Hop et al., 2014) for low virulent CSF 
requires data for the low virulent strain which are not available in the literature. Secondly, the 
risk of low virulent CSF introduction is extremely low for the Netherlands in current situation, 
because the low virulent CSF reserved in wild boars in Germany-Netherlands border areas 
has been eradicated (2012/250/EU: Commission Implementing Decision of 8 May 2012). The 
low introduction probability will make the annual benefits very small compared to the 
additional surveillance costs. Hence, it is very likely that applying intensified surveillance-
setups for a low virulent CSF strain will not be beneficial.  
     
4.4.2. Modelling approach 
The current research uses two simulation models: the CSF surveillance simulation model and 
the CSF impact simulation model (Hop et al., 2014). The CSF surveillance simulation model 
was developed based on the conceptual framework for economic analysis of single hazard 
surveillance systems (Guo et al., 2014). The CSF impact simulation model described by Hop 
et al. (2014) was developed based on a generic model, InterSpread Plus, and its credibility 
was verified by Sanson et al. (1999), Stevenson et al. (2013), and Dube et al. (2007). Hence, 
the modelling approach is suitable for this research.   
 
Two types of data are used in this research: 1) the data to parameterize the CSF surveillance 
simulation model, and 2) the data on the economic impact of a CSF epidemic to quantify the 
benefits of CSF surveillance. The data required by the surveillance simulation model include 
the values of transmission parameters, the background and CSF-related symptom probabilities 
for individual animals, and the data for the surveillance system components (SSCs). Where 
possible, parameterization was based on data from literature (transmission parameters, 
background mortalities), followed by expert opinion in situations where no literature was 
available (background probabilities for clinical symptoms). In some cases, a combination of 
both sources was used (CSF-related symptom probabilities and data for SSCs). The data on 
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the economic impact of a CSF epidemic were derived from Hop et al. (2014). The models 
were parameterized with appropriate inputs based on the best available data.  
 
The sensitivity analysis for the CSF surveillance simulation model showed that the sets of 
efficient surveillance setups for both low and moderately virulent strains were robust (i.e. 
changes in the parameter values did not change the efficient surveillance setups). The results 
of the cost-benefit analysis (Table 4.6) were also robust, because the additional annual 
surveillance costs are much higher than the annual benefits in all cases. Even though the input 
data was uncertain, this uncertainty is not likely to change the findings regarding the efficient 
surveillance setups. The model results are also consistent with the actual 1997-1998 CSF 
epidemic in the Netherlands and with existing literature on CSF surveillance. The estimated 
median duration of the HRP with the moderately virulent CSF was 38 days, which is close to 
the actual HRP for the 1997-1998 Dutch CSF epidemic of approximately six weeks (Jalvingh 
et al. 1999). It is also similar to the durations of 35 days, 37 days and 38 days in Klinkenberg 
et al. (2005), Raulo and Lyytikainen (2007) and Backer et al. (2011), respectively.  
 
4.4.3. Implications for other countries  
The results of this study are also relevant for other countries, especially the Western European 
countries such as Germany, Belgium, Denmark and France, where the pig industry structures 
have quite some similarity to that of the Netherlands. For those countries, since prevention 
methods are applied, the probability of CSF introduction has been reduced to a relatively low 
level (the Western Europe has been free of CSF in commercial pigs for 16 years). The low 
introduction probability makes the expected surveillance benefits become much smaller than 
the surveillance costs to maintain intensified surveillance setups. Therefore, the conclusion 
that intensified surveillance setups are economically unbeneficial could also apply to the 
aforementioned Western European countries. Moreover, for some areas of those Western 
European countries (e.g. Part of Northern Vosges, France (Laddomada, 2000)), there are wild 
boars that can contain low virulent CSFVs; therefore, in those areas, the probability of low 
virulent CSF introduction to the commercial pigs is high. Our finding that serology 
surveillance is cost-effective for detecting low virulent CSF implies that adding additional 
serology surveillance in such areas can be justified.     
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4.4.4. Conclusions and limitations 
From the current study, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the default Dutch CSF 
surveillance setup (including “Daily clinical observation by the farmer”, “Veterinarian 
inspection after a call”, “Routine veterinarian inspection”, “Pathology in AHS”, “PCR on 
tonsil in AHS”, “PCR on grouped animals in CVI”, and “Confirmatory PCR by NVWA”) is 
included in the efficient set of surveillance setups for both the moderately virulent and low 
virulent CSF strains. This indicates that the default surveillance setup is a reasonable choice. 
Secondly, with the exception of the default surveillance setup, the efficient sets of 
surveillances for the moderately and low virulent CSF strains are different. For the 
moderately virulent strain, all of the alterative efficient surveillance-setups contained the SSC 
‘PCR on rendered animals’. For the low virulent strain, the alterative efficient surveillance 
setups all contained the routine serology SSCs. Finally, from an economic perspective, the 
current Dutch CSF surveillance system is considered adequate for the moderately virulent 
CSF strain; there is little to be gained by intensifying surveillance.  
 
The limitations of this study include the lack of cost-benefit analysis for the low virulent 
strain and the neglect of the non-economic benefits in the evaluation. Moreover, although the 
number of the specific breeding farms is small, excluding such farms may have impact on the 
model’s outcome because the infected breeding farms can have a big capacity to spread the 
virus. Future research should focus on dealing with such limitations.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Fig. A1. Sensitivity analysis: increasing the with-farm transmission parameter by 50% for moderately virulent CSF  
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setup with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A2. Sensitivity analysis: decreasing the with-farm transmission parameter by 50% for moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setup with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A3. Sensitivity analysis: increasing the between-farm transmission parameter by 50% for moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A4. Sensitivity analysis: decreasing the between-farm transmission parameter by 50% for moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A5. Sensitivity analysis: making the CSF-related symptoms of the infected individuals occur two days earlier for 
moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP for 
14 surveillance setups are presented with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A6. Sensitivity analysis: making the CSF-related symptoms of the infected individuals occur two days later for 
moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A7. Sensitivity analysis: reducing the sensitivity of the ELISA test to 90% for moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A8. Sensitivity analysis: reducing the sensitivity of the PCR test to 90% for moderately virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the moderately virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setup with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A9. Sensitivity analysis: increasing the with-farm transmission parameter by 50% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A10. Sensitivity analysis: decreasing the with-farm transmission parameter by 50% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A11. Sensitivity analysis: increasing the between-farm transmission parameter by 50% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A12. Sensitivity analysis: decreasing the between-farm transmission parameter by 50% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A13. Sensitivity analysis: making the CSF-related symptoms of the infected individuals occur two days earlier for low 
virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A14. Sensitivity analysis: making the CSF-related symptoms of the infected individuals occur two days later for low 
virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A15. Sensitivity analysis: reducing the sensitivity of the ELISA test to 90% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setups with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Fig. A16. Sensitivity analysis: reducing the sensitivity of the PCR test to 90% for low virulent CSF 
The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the duration of the HRP and the number of the infected farms at the end of the HRP 
are presented for 14 surveillance setup scenarios with the low virulent strain.  
1: D, 2: D+S12,  3: D+R6,3, 4: D+SL5, 5: D+S24, 6: D+R6,3+S12, 7: D+SL5+S12, 8: D+SL5+R6,3, 9: D+SL10, 10: D+S36, 11: 
D+SL5+R6,3+S12, 12: D+SL15, 13: D+R6,1, 14: D+R1,1.   
The surveillance setups with square-shaped medians are the most efficient among the surveillance setups evaluated. 
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Table A1
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for individual piglets infected by moderately virulent CSF    
symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 References
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 a,  h , c, d, k
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.09 0 c, d, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.08 0 c, d, k 
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.07 0 k
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.16 0 0 0 c, d, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.14 0 0 0 a, c, k
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.05 0 c, d, e, b, k 
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.11 0 0 0 a, c, f, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0 0 0 a , c, e, f, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.09 0 0 0 a , f, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.07 0 0 0 c, d, f, k
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.5 0 c, d, g, k
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1 j, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.05 0 0 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.03 0 0 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.01 0 0 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.06 0 0 0 0 k
a
Ribbens (2009)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
c
Dewulf et al. (2001a)
d
Laevens et al. (1999)
e
Uttenthal et al. (2003)
f
Klinkerberg et al. (2005)
g
Dewulf et al. (2001b)
h
Weesendorp et al. (2009b)
j
Colijn et al. (1997)
k
expert opinion
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for infected individuals 
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Table A2
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for sows and slaughter pigs infected by moderately virulent CSF    
symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0 a,  h, c, d, k
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.3 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.09 0 c, d, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.2 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0 c, d, k 
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.1 0.07 0 k
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.2 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0 c, d, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.3 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0 a, c, k
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.15 0.05 0.03 0 c, d, e, b, k 
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0 a, c, f, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 0 a , c, e, f, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 a , f, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0 0 0 0 c, d, f, k
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.5 0 c, d, g, k
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1.00 j, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 k
a
Ribbens (2009)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
c
Dewulf et al. (2001a)
d
Laevens et al. (1999)
e
Uttenthal et al. (2003)
f
Klinkerberg et al. (2005)
g
Dewulf et al. (2001b)
h
Weesendorp et al.  (2009b)
j
Colijn et al. (1997)
k
expert opinion
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for infected individuals 
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Table A3
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for individual piglets infected by low virulent CSF
symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d, e, k
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.2 0 0 0 a, b, k
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1.00 f, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
a
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009b)
c
Floegel-Niesmann et al. (2003)
d
Terpstra (1991)
e
Liess (1988)
f 
Colijn et al. (1997)
g
Mittelholzer et al. (2000)
k
expert opinion 
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for infected individuals 
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Table A4
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for sows and slaughter pigs infected by low virulent CSF  
symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 29 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0 a, b, c, g, k
Apathy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0 a, b, c, g, k
Loss of appetite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0 a, b, c, g, k
Respiratory disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0 a, b, c, g, k
Constipation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0 a, b, c, g, k
Diarrhoea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 a, b, c, g, k
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d, e, k
Suspicious symptoms:
Conjunctivitis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 a, b, c, g, k
Skin haemorrhage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Blue ear / tail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Hind leg weakness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, g, k
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.2 0 a, b, k
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1.00 f, k
In  organs:
Tonsil lesions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 k
Spleen infarction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Enlargement of  lymph node 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
Internal bleeding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 k
a
Weesendorp et al. (2009a)
b
Weesendorp et al. (2009b)
c
Floegel-Niesmann et al. (2003)
d
Terpstra (1991)
e
Liess (1988)
f 
Colijn et al. (1997)
g
Mittelholzer et al. (2000)
k
expert opinion 
Days post infection
Daily probability of showing CSF-related symptoms for infected individuals 
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Chapter 5 
Economic optimization of the pig-hazard surveillance portfolio in 
a Dutch food company 
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Abstract 
Traditional research treats livestock hazard surveillance as a single-hazard surveillance 
optimization problem. The single-hazard perspective fails to find the optimal surveillance 
resource allocation within a surveillance organization. To solve this problem, we have 
developed a novel conceptual framework that uses a surveillance portfolio perspective to 
guide surveillance resource allocation. This paper aims to apply that framework to a case 
study where a Dutch food company tries to optimize its pig-hazard surveillance portfolio in 
the slaughterhouses. This study, on the one hand, vividly shows that livestock hazard 
surveillance should be conducted from a portfolio point of view because it can increase the 
efficiency of the surveillance activities in a surveillance organization. On the other hand, it 
also demonstrates the difficulty in applying the surveillance-portfolio conceptual framework 
due to the limitation of the data.          
Keywords: Livestock hazard surveillance; surveillance portfolio; surveillance resource 
allocation 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Resources available to conduct livestock hazard surveillance in general are becoming more 
and more limited (Stärk et al., 2006). As a result, increasing demands are posed on 
surveillance organizations to improve the cost-effectiveness of their surveillance activities. In 
practice, surveillance organizations often have multiple hazards to survey which compete for 
the same limited surveillance resources; hence, the resource allocation problem should be 
tackled from a surveillance portfolio (SP) point of view instead of single hazard surveillance 
system (SHSS) (Prattley et al., 2007; Prattley et al., 2009; Guo et al., 2014c). In additions, 
since the decision maker may have different preferences on various types of impacts mitigated 
by hazard surveillance (e.g. reduced economic losses, reduced human health influence, etc.), 
stakeholder’s valuation of such impacts must be incorporated into the analysis.   
 
A Dutch food company provides services in pig slaughtering and pork processing. To ensure 
food safety, currently the company conducts surveillance activities on a portfolio of pig 
hazards, including Swine Vesicular Disease (SVD), Aujeszky’s Disease (AD), Salmonella, 
Toxoplasma and Mycobacterium avium (MA). Routine serological surveillance is conducted 
in the slaughterhouses of that company with various sampling surveillance setups, subject to a 
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certain level of annual surveillance budget. However, due to the lack of quantitative decision 
support tool, the previously applied serological sampling scheme was arbitrarily determined, 
which is not scientifically sound.      
 
Towards an improved serological surveillance performance in the aforementioned Dutch food 
company, this paper conduct a model-based analysis of the company’s pig-hazard SP, based 
on the conceptual framework described by Guo et al. (2014c), aiming at optimizing the 
surveillance resource allocation among competing hazards to maximize the total performance 
of the pig-hazard SP.     
 
5.2 Material and Method 
5.2.1. The surveillance portfolio optimization model  
The original SP optimization model has been developed in Guo et al. (2014c) to solve the 
multi-stakeholder, multi-criteria SP optimization problem. Since the pig-hazard case only has 
one stakeholder (i.e. the Dutch food company), the original model can be deduced to a single-
stakeholder model as follows:       
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑉 = (𝑤1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐼) × (
𝑣1(𝑋)
⋮
𝑣𝐼(𝑋)
)                                                                                    (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                      
s.t. various constraints, such as 
∑ 𝑥ℎ,𝑠
𝑆ℎ
𝑠=1 ≤ 1 for all h,            (2) 
∑ ∑ 𝑐ℎ,𝑠𝑥ℎ,𝑠 ≤ 𝐵
𝑆ℎ
𝑠=1
𝐻
ℎ=1 ,                       (3) 
𝑥ℎ,𝑠 ∈ (0, 1) for all h, s            (4) 
where 
𝑃𝑉 is the surveillance portfolio performance; 
(𝑤1 ⋯ 𝑤𝐼) are the weights on HIIs 1 to I; 
(
𝑣1(𝑋)
⋮
𝑣𝐼(𝑋)
) is the vector of the standardized portfolio performances (SPP) on all HIIs;  
𝑣𝑖(𝑋) is the standardized portfolio performance on indicator i, given X. 
X is the decision variable matrix of xh,s.  
𝑥ℎ,𝑠 denotes the binary decision variable to judge whether, for hazard h, surveillance setup s is 
selected to compose the SP.  
𝑆ℎ denotes the number of the alternative surveillance setups for hazard h.  
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𝐵 denotes the total annual budget available to carry out the surveillance activities.  
𝑐ℎ,𝑠  is the annual surveillance costs for hazard h, when surveillance setup s is implemented.  
The set of constraints (2) ensure that a maximum of one surveillance setup for each hazard 
will be included in the SP; constraints (3) ensure that the total annual surveillance costs for 
stakeholder group g cannot exceed the annual available surveillance budget; and definitions (4) 
defines 𝑥ℎ,𝑠  as binary variables. Additional constraints are considered in this paper including 
the minimum required surveillance performance constraint and legal obligation constraints.  
 
5.2.2. Farms and animals  
In this study, three types of pig farms are considered, which are the farrowing farms, the 
finishing farms and farrow-to-finish farms. The detailed distributions of the farms and 
animals on them are estimated based on a database of Dutch pig farms in 2010 (provided by 
Dutch Animal Health Service), combined with expert options (see Table 5.1).  
 
 
 
It is also estimated from the same database that there are about half of the finishing and 
farrow-to-finish farms that submit pigs to the slaughterhouses of the Dutch food company. 
Therefore, approximately 2500 finishing farms and 180 farrow-to-finish farms submit pigs to 
the company’s slaughterhouses. In practice, the farrowing farms can also send old sows for 
slaughtering. However, compared to the submission frequency of the slaughter pigs, the 
frequency for the farrowing farms to submit the old sows to slaughterhouses is relatively low 
and will have a minimal impact on the performances of surveillance systems. Hence, the 
submissions of old sows from the farrowing farms to the slaughterhouses of the Dutch food 
company are disregarded in the model.  
 
 
Table 5.1
The distribution of farms and animals (averages) estimated from the  
Dutch pig farm database 2010 provided by the Animal Health Service 
Farm type Number of farms
Piglet Sow Hog
Farrowing 2300 2000 400 0
Finishing 5000 0 0 830
Farrow-to-finish 360 1090 220 800
Number of animals
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5.2.3. The single hazard analysis model 
SVD and AD are the zero-prevalence diseases: the diseases that do not exist in the 
Netherlands at the moment. Guo et al. (2014b) adapted the SHSS analysis framework 
described by Guo et al. (2014a) to develop the surveillance simulation model for classical 
swine fever (CSF) which is another typical zero-prevalence disease for the Netherlands. In 
this work, the same surveillance simulation model is re-parameterized to analyse the SVD and 
AD surveillance. The technical surveillance performances for SVD and AD are (1) the 
duration of high risk period (HRP) and (2) the number of infected farms at the end of HRP. 
For SVD, the within- and between-farm transmission parameters are βw =0.52 per infectious 
animal per day and βb=0.0017 per infectious animal per day respectively (Eisinger, 2012). For 
AD, they are βw =0.1 per infectious animal per day (De Jong and Kimman, 1994) and 
βb1=0.0012
7
 (Local spread) and βb1=0.0015 (transport spread) per infectious animal per day. 
The SVD and AD expression matrices for disease symptom modelling in individual animals 
are presented in Appendix (Table 1A, Table 2A, Table 3A and Table 4A). These matrices 
were constructed by combining literature studies with expert opinions.  
 
Salmonella, Toxoplasma and MA are the diseases that currently exist in the Netherlands. The 
technical surveillance performance for them is measured by the “herd-level sensitivity” for 
detecting the positive farms. Van der Wolf et al. (2001) shows that the distribution of herd 
prevalence of salmonella for Dutch pig farms is close to exponential distribution with the 
mean 15.4% (Van der Wolf et al., 2001). Therefore, the exponential distribution is used to 
generate the starting situation of salmonella for the Netherlands. The transmission parameter 
for salmonella refers to Correia-Gomes et al. (2014), which equals to 0.22 per animal per 
week (i.e. 0.44 per animal per two weeks). The expression matrices for salmonella are 
constructed based on Nielsen et al. (1995) and Calveyra et al. (2011), combined with expert 
opinions, and are presented in Appendix (Table 5A). The prevalence of Toxoplasma and MA 
in slaughter pigs are 3% (Meerburg et al., 2006) and 1% (Hiller et al. 2013) respectively. 
Exponential distributions with the means 3% and 1% are also used to generate the starting 
situations of Toxoplasma and MA. The used within-farm transmission parameter for 
Toxoplasma is 0.02 per infectious animal per week (Aranda et al., 2008). The within-farm 
                                                 
7The transmission parameters for AD should be smaller than that for CSF (Personal contact with a CSF expert). The within 
farm transmission parameter for AD (βw =0.1) is about half of the size for CSF (βw =0.21 in Klinkenberg et al. (2005)). Hence, 
the between farm transmission parameter is also assumed half of the size for CSF. Since Klinkenberg, et al. (2005) estimate 
that βb1 and βb2 are 0.0024 and 0.0029 per infectious animal per day, the between farm transmission parameters is assumed 
0.0012 (local spread) and 0.0015 (transport spread) per infectious animal per day.   
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transmission parameter for MA is assumed following uniform distribution [0, 0.67] per 
infectious animal per week. The expression matrices for MA and Toxoplasma are constructed 
by combining literature data with expert opinions (Table 6A and Table 7A).    
 
5.2.4. Investigated surveillance setups  
The investigated surveillance setups for each hazard are presented in Table 5.2.  
 
136 
 
Table 5.2
The investigated surveillance setups 
SVD (blood samples per herd per trimester) AD ( blood samples per herd per trimester) Salmonella (blood samples per herd per year) MA (blood samples per herd per year) Toxoplasma (blood samples per herd per year)
0 0 0 0 0
3 3 12 10 10
24 20 20
36 30 30
72 45 45
108 60 60
75 75
The surveillance setups in bold are currently applied by the company   
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The surveillance setups currently applied by the company are marked in bold. Each 
surveillance setup for each hazard is investigated by the single hazard analysis model which 
delivers the technical surveillance performance and annual surveillance costs. Based on the 
derived technical surveillance performances and annual surveillance costs for each 
surveillance setup, an efficient set of surveillance setups can be obtained for each hazard (See 
Guo et al., 2014a).  
 
5.2.5. Input derivation for the surveillance portfolio optimization model  
Regardless of the types of technical surveillance performances, each hazard causes impacts 
(e.g. economic impacts, food safety impacts, etc.), and the implementation of a SP can 
mitigate these impacts which are the benefits delivered by that SP. Therefore, estimating and 
valuating the impacts under each potential SP based on the corresponding technical 
surveillance performances is the prerequisite for SP optimization (i.e. providing the inputs for 
the SP optimization model). Below are the two steps we follow for impact estimation and 
valuation: 
Step 1: By consulting surveillance managers in the Dutch food company, four hazard impact 
indicators (HII) are identified to measure the impacts of the hazards, including “Economics”, 
“Animal Health and Welfare”, “Food Safety” and “Consumer and Customer Trust”. The 
surveillance managers also give the weights to each HII to reflect their relative importance, 
and the summation of the weights of all indicators is equal to 1 (See: Table 5.3).   
Step 2: To estimate the impact parameters on each of the four HIIs under each surveillance 
setup for each hazard, theoretically, hazard impact simulation models such as the model of 
Hop et al. (2014) should be used. However, there are no such models for the five hazards 
considered in this work, and developing those models is extremely laborious. Considering the 
time and resource limitations, we decided to use a shortcut way described in (Guo et al., 
2014c) to estimate the impact parameters, namely, asking three relevant disease experts to 
estimate the impact parameters based on the obtained technical performances from the single 
hazard surveillance analysis. Since it is very difficult for the experts to come up with absolute 
numbers on HIIs, the experts are asked to give category-based impact parameters from 0 to 
100, where 0 indicates the worst performance on a HII and 100 indicates the best performance 
(See: Table 5.3).    
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5.2.6. Sensitivity analysis  
As is shown in previous sections, there are quite some uncertainties associated with the 
surveillance portfolio optimization model’s inputs such as the impact parameters and weights 
to HIIs. Hence, sensitivity analysis is conducted on those parameters to check how robust the 
results of the model are.  The investigated model parameters are suggested by the experts and 
stakeholders including (1) the legal constraints for SVD and AD (i.e. each farm is obligatory 
to have 3 blood samples tested per trimester by law), (2) the stakeholder’s weights8 to each 
HII and (3) the uncertain impact parameters on HIIs according to the experts.      
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1. Results under the default setting  
The results from the first-stage analysis under the default setting are presented in Table 5.3 
which provides the inputs for the surveillance portfolio optimization model. The currently 
implemented surveillance setups and alternative surveillance setups are listed. The currently 
implemented surveillance setups are marked in bold. For each surveillance setup of each 
hazard, items are listed including the annual surveillance costs, technical surveillance 
performances, hazard impact parameters estimated by three disease experts, and the weights 
to each HII assigned by the stakeholder (i.e. the food company).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The investigated parameter space is suggested by the stakeholder.   
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Table 5.3
The first-stage results for each surveillance setup of each hazard under the default setting  
Potential surveillance setups Annual surveillance costs Technical surveillance 
for each hazard (K€)  performances (medians) Economics (50%) Animal health and welfare (20%)  Food safety (25%) Consumer and customer trust (5%)
SVD
(1) 0 blood sample per herd per trimester 0 HRP: 36 days,  infected farms: 6  50 50 0 55
(2) 3 blood samples per herd per trimester 147 HRP: 36 days,  infected farms: 6  50 50 0 55
AD
(1) 0 blood sample per herd per trimester 0 HRP: 47 days,  infected farms: 4 60 60 0 55
(2) 3 blood samples per herd per trimester 130 HRP: 47 days,  infected farms: 4 60 60 0 55
Salmonella
(1) 0 blood samples per herd per year 0 Herd-level Sensitivity 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 12 blood samples per herd per year 170 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.59 80 75 5 85
(3) 24 blood samples per herd per year 341 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.71 90 86 10 93
(4) 36 blood samples per herd per year 511 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.76 94 95 20 96
(5) 72 blood samples per herd per year 1023 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.77 95 96 35 97
(6) 108 blood samples per herd per year 1534 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.82 97 98 60 98
MA
(1) 0 blood samples per herd per year  0 Herd-level Sensitivity 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 10 blood samples per herd per year 214 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.17 0 0 2 60
(3) 20 blood samples per herd per year 429 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.31 50 0 5 76
(4) 30 blood samples per herd per year 643 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.41 58 0 8 86
(5) 45 blood samples per herd per year 965 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.52 64 0 12 93
(6) 60 blood samples per herd per year 1286 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.61 71 0 15 96
(7) 75 blood samples per herd per year 1608 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.67 76 0 25 98
Toxoplasma 
(1) 0 blood samples per herd per year  0 Herd-level Sensitivity 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 10 blood samples per herd per year 67 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.32 55 0 5 65
(3) 20 blood samples per herd per year 134 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.50 67 0 10 85
(4) 30 blood samples per herd per year 201 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.60 73 0 15 90
(5) 45 blood samples per herd per year 302 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.71 81 0 23 94
(6) 60 blood samples per herd per year 402 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.75 83 0 30 95
(7) 75 blood samples per herd per year 503 Herd-level Sensitivity 0.80 87 0 40 97
Hazard Impact Parameters (0 - 100)
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The results from the second-stage analysis with the surveillance portfolio optimization model 
are presented in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1. The analytical results under the default setting.  
 
Graph (a) of Figure 5.1 presents SPs that ensure the maximum portfolio performance (relative 
to the performance delivered by the default SP) subject to various annual budget levels 
(relative to the default annual budget level). Graph (b) just shows the opposite, namely, the 
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SPs that ensures the minimum annual surveillance costs (relative to the default annual budget 
level) subject to various minimum required SP performances (relative to the performance 
delivered by the default SP).     
 
Graph (a) of Figure 5.1 shows that the alternative SP (2,2,4,3,6) can almost ensure the same 
SP performance as the default SP (2,2,4,5,5) but only require 80% of the annual default 
budget. The difference is caused by reducing the surveillance intensity for MA (from 
surveillance setup 5 to 3) and using the saved money to intensify the surveillance for 
Toxoplasma (from surveillance setup 5 to 6). It is also shown that even though reducing the 
budget to 20% of the default, it can still maintain around 50% of the default SP performance 
(see SP(2,2,1,1,3)). Moreover, even if increasing the budget to 180% of the default, the 
corresponding maximum SP performance is just 110% of the default SP performance (see SP 
(2,2,6,6,7)). In general, Graph (a) of Figure 5.1 demonstrates diminishing returns of the SP 
performance to every additional level of budget.      
 
Graph (b) of Figure 5.1 shows that maintaining the default SP performance actually only 
requires about 95% of the default annual budget (see SP (2,2,4,4,7)). If increasing the 
required minimum SP performance to 110% of the default, then it requires about 190% of the 
default annual budget (see SP (2,2,6,7,7)). If reducing the minimum SP performance to 40% 
of the default, the required annual budget only equals 17% of the default. In general, Graph (b) 
of Figure 5.1 exhibits an increasing annual-budget requirement for every additional level of 
required minimum SP performance.             
 
5.3.2. Results of the sensitivity analysis 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Figure 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7.  
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Fig.5.2. The sensitivity analysis results when the legal constraints for SVD and AD are 
relaxed.  
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Fig. 5.3. The sensitivity analysis results when the stakeholder’s weights on HIIs are changed 
to: Economics (0.3), Animal health and welfare (0.25), Food safety (0.3) and Consumer and 
customer trust (0.15). 
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Fig. 5.4. The sensitivity analysis results when the stakeholder’s weights on HIIs are changed 
to: Economics (0.7), Animal health and welfare (0.08), Food safety (0.2) and Consumer and 
customer trust (0.02). 
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Fig. 5.5. The sensitivity analysis results when the impact parameters on the HII “Consumer 
and customer trust” for SVD changed to: surveillance setup 1 (80), surveillance setup 2 (80); 
for AD, they are changed to:  surveillance setup 1 (85), surveillance setup 2 (85).  
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Fig. 5.6. The sensitivity analysis results when the impact parameters on the HII “Consumer 
and customer trust” for SVD changed to: surveillance setup 1 (5), surveillance setup 2 (5); for 
AD, they are changed to:  surveillance setup 1 (15), surveillance setup 2 (15).  
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Fig. 5.7. The sensitivity analysis results when the impact parameters on the HII “food safety” 
for Toxoplasma changed to: surveillance setup 1 (0), surveillance setup 2 (5), surveillance 
setup 3 (10), surveillance setup 4 (20), surveillance setup 5 (35), surveillance setup 6 (53), 
surveillance setup 7 (70).  
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The results in Figure 5.2 show that the elimination of legal constraints for SVD and AD will 
result in the switches to the SPs all containing the first surveillance setups for SVD and AD 
(i.e. do not conduct serological surveillance for SVD and AD). The maximum SP 
performances for certain levels of budget become larger than that under the default setting (i.e. 
with the legal constraints for SVD and AD). Correspondingly, the minimum annual 
surveillance costs to maintain certain levels of required minimum SP performance become 
smaller than that under the default setting. Changing stakeholder’ weights to HIIs does not 
have obvious impacts on the results compared to those in the default setting (see Figure 5.3 
and 5.4). This is because in this specific case, the estimated impact parameters on HIIs are 
highly correlated between indicators. The changes of the uncertain impact parameters also do 
not have big impacts on the outlook of the graphs (see Figure 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7), which 
demonstrates the robustness of the modelling results.  
  
5.4 Discussion and conclusion  
5.4.1 Content of this study 
This study extends the current body of SP optimization literature (Prattley et al., 2007; 
Prattley et al., 2009) by considering the stakeholder’s valuation of surveillance outcomes 
according to various hazard impact indicators (HIIs). The SP conceptual framework in Guo et 
al (2014c) is adapted to conduct the optimization analysis of a pig-hazard SP operated by a 
Dutch food company.  
 
The modelling results clearly demonstrate the non-optimum situation of the current pig-
hazard SP in the Dutch food company due to the fact that the food company can improve the 
SP performance without increasing the annual surveillance budget or decrease the annual 
surveillance costs without scarifying the SP performance. This demonstrates the usefulness of 
applying the SP optimization framework for surveillance resource allocations. Moreover, the 
investigated pig-hazard SP exhibits diminishing returns of surveillance performance to every 
additional level of annual budget (i.e. surveillance performance is easier to improve when its 
value is low but harder to improve when its value is high). Consistently, it also exhibits 
increasing annual-budget requirement for every additional level of required minimum SP 
performance.   
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5.4.2 Modelling approach 
The general modelling approach used in this work is the SP optimization model developed 
based on the SP optimization framework proposed by Guo et al. (2014c).  Before running the 
SP optimization model, its inputs should be derived using the single hazard surveillance 
simulation models adapted from the single hazard analysis framework developed by Guo et al. 
(2014a). The theoretical appropriateness of both the single hazard and the SP frameworks has 
been extensively discussed in Guo et al. (2014a,c). The single hazard analysis framework has 
been adapted to analyze the CSF surveillance in the Netherlands (Guo et al. 2014b), which 
demonstrates the practical appropriateness of the single hazard analysis framework.  
 
5.4.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations associated with this research. The biggest limitation is caused by 
the lack of data for parameterizing the single hazard surveillance simulation model as well as 
the SP optimization model. Since the epidemiological data, such as disease transmission 
parameters and the data to construct the hazard expression matrices, are not rich in the 
literature, we need to make approximations and rely on relevant experts’ opinions. An even 
bigger problem is to estimate the impact parameters on HIIs based on the derived technical 
surveillance performance for each surveillance setup. For the hazards investigated in the pig-
hazard portfolio, it has been already very hard to find adequate experts to make the 
estimations, not even to mean to construct expert panel for more sophisticated analysis (e.g. 
Delphi analysis). Moreover, due to the time and resource limitations, the single hazard 
simulation models were constructed in a simplified way because adapting and parameterizing 
five single hazard surveillance models in such a way has been already extremely laborious. 
The highly simplifications of the modelling process inevitably brings in some bias to the 
model’s results.  
  
5.4.4 Conclusions   
Although this is a more theoretical-oriented work, we can still draw useful conclusions from it. 
The first conclusion we can draw is that surveillance organizations should really use a 
portfolio perspective to guide their surveillance resource allocation because the case clearly 
shows that arbitrarily allocating surveillance costs can cause efficiency losses (either in terms 
of higher surveillance costs or low SP performance). Furthermore, eliminating legal 
constraints for some hazards in a SP may result in higher SP performance. Finally, the 
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robustness of the results (with regard to the stakeholder’s weights to HIIs) given the high 
correlations of impact parameters between HIIs implies that under such a situation, it will not 
be necessary to have a very robust elicitation of the stakeholder’s preferences to HIIs.  
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Appendix  
 
 
 
Table 1A
The expression matrix for piglets infected by swine vescular disease
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, d, e
Anorexia 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d
Lamness 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d
Vesicles 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d, g, h, j
horn saparation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 a, c, f
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b, d, e
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 d
a
Loxan and Hedger (1983)
b
EFSA (2012)
c
Hakhverdyan et al.(2006)
d
Dekker et al. (1995)
e
Eisinger (2012)
f
OIE
g
Burrows et al. (1974)
h
Lai et al. (1979)
j
Mann and Hutchings (1980)
Probabilities of expression occurrences in each day post infection
Table 2A
The expression matrix for hogs and sows infected by swine vescular disease
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Non-specific symptoms:
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.3 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, d, e
Anorexia 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d
Lamness 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d
Vesicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, d, g, h, j
horn saparation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0 a, c, f
Pathological findings
In  blood:
Antigen/virus(infectious) 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b, d, e
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 d
aLoxan and Hedger (1983)
bEFSA (2012)
cHakhverdyan et al.(2006)
dDekker et al. (1995)
eEisinger (2012)
fOIE
gBurrows et al. (1974)
hLai et al. (1979)
jMann and Hutchings (1980)
Probabilities of expression occurrences in each day post infection
Table 3A
The day-dependent, post-infection probabilities of symptoms occurences for individual piglets infected by Aujesky’s Disease 
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Fever 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 a, b, c
Neurological symptoms 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0 0 0 0 b, c, d, e
Anorexia 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 b, c, d, e
Lossing Weights 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 a
Respiratory symptoms  0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b, c, d, e
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b, c
Pathological findings
Antigen/virus (infectious) 0 0.5 0.8 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, c 
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  f
a
Vilnis et al. (1998)
b
Gerdts et al. (1997) 
c
Gerdts et al. (1999) 
d
Mikulska-Skupien et al. (2004) 
e
Kritas et al. (1997)
f
Todd et al. (1987) 
The probabilities of symptoms occurrences in each day post infection
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Table 4A
The day-dependent, post-infection probabilities of symptoms occurences for adult animals infected by Aujesky’s Disease 
Expressions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Reference 
Clinical symptoms
Fever 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b, c, d, e
Respiratory symptoms  0 0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c, d
Anorexia 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  c, d 
Lossing Weights 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a
Neurological symptoms 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  c, d 
Death 0 0 0 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d
Pathological findings
Antigen/virus (infectious) 0 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.35 0.25 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, c, e
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 c
a
Rakel et al. (2007)
b
Kimman et al. (1992)
c
Wittmann et al. (1980)
d
Nauwynck and Pensaert (1995) 
e
Miry et al. (1987)
The probabilities of symptoms occurrences in each day post infection
Table 5A
The expression matrix for adult animals infected by salmonella
Expressions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Reference
Antigen/bacteria(infectious) 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 a, b
Antibodies 0 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 a
a
Nielsen et al. (1995)
b
Calveyra et al. (2012)
Probabilities of expression occurrences each week post infection
Table 6A
The weekly probability of symptom occuring for pigs infected by Mycobacterium avium   
Symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Reference 
Mycobacterium avium excretion 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 b, c
Antibodies 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 a, d
a
Wisselink et al. (2010)
b
Garrido et al. (2010)
c
Angelika et al. (2012)
d
Hiller et al. (2013)
 Week post infection
Probabilities of symptom occurrences for individuals
Table 7A
The weekly probability of symptom occuring for pigs infected by Toxoplasma gondii  
Symptoms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Reference 
Toxoplasma gondii isolation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 e 
Antibodies 0 0 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 a, b, c, d  
a
Lind et al. (1997)
b
Basso et al. (2013)
c
Garcia et al. (2006)
d
Forbes et al. (2012)
e
Dubey et al. (1996)
 Week post infection
Probabilities of symptom occurrences for individuals
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6.1 Introduction  
This PhD dissertation aims to address the economic optimization problem for livestock hazard 
surveillance, namely, improving the surveillance resource allocation to achieve surveillance 
performance maximization or surveillance costs minimization. Although several studies have 
been conducted to improve surveillance in livestock production chains, they have limitations 
in terms of their coverage of economic aspects and the level of modelling in the interaction 
between hazard dynamics and surveillance activities. Hence, the dissertation is motivated to 
(1) improve the understanding of hazard surveillance in livestock production chains from an 
economic perspective, and (2) to apply the obtained knowledge for better model-based in-
depth analysis of livestock hazard surveillance. To realize this overall objective, four research 
chapters (Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5) were developed. Chapter 2 presented a conceptual framework 
for single hazard surveillance analysis including a stochastic simulation model and a multi-
criteria decision making model to evaluate the impacts of the hazard surveillance. Chapter 3 
proposed a conceptual framework for surveillance portfolio optimization when multiple 
hazard surveillance systems are operated by a surveillance organization such as the Food 
Safety Authority. Chapter 4 and 5 apply the developed frameworks to two case studies for 
single hazard surveillance analysis and surveillance portfolio optimization respectively.           
 
6.2 Synthesis 
Surveillance in livestock production chains is an important managerial issue from both 
scientific and practical perspectives. However, a conceptual framework that can be applied by 
decision makers and stakeholders to guide their surveillance activities is still to some extent 
lacking. To fill in this knowledge gap, this dissertation developed two interlinked conceptual 
frameworks (Chapter 2 and 3) to address livestock hazard surveillance from different angles, 
i.e. single hazard and surveillance portfolio. Traditional research on single-hazard surveillance 
analysis tends to focus on the technical aspects of surveillance (i.e. the technical surveillance 
performances) but neglects the economic aspects of surveillance (e.g., Ward et al., 1996; 
Bouma, et al., 2001; Paisley et al., 2011; Willeberg et al., 2011; Bruhn et al., 2014; Stevens 
and Pfeiffer, 2014). The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 for single-hazard 
surveillance analysis incorporates economic aspects to address livestock hazard surveillance 
in a standard way, considering the principles described by Häsler et al. (2011). The single-
hazard surveillance analysis framework also incorporates stakeholders’ preferences into the 
evaluation process. The surveillance-portfolio analysis framework uses the single-hazard 
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surveillance analysis framework as the basis. It extends the problem scope from single hazard 
to multiple hazards. Livestock surveillance analyses have been extensively conducted for 
single hazard (e.g., Feld et al., 2000; Raulo and Lyytikainen, 2007; Martinez et al., 2011; 
Todd and Notermans, 2011; Chan et al., 2013; Dürr et al., 2013. To the opposite, research 
addressing livestock hazard surveillance from a portfolio perspective has been rarely seen in 
the literature, except for Prattley et al. (2007) and Prattley (2009). Whereas Prattley et al., 
(2007) and Prattley (2009) only address the epidemic disease surveillance, the developed 
surveillance-portfolio analysis framework in Chapter 3 is applicable to different types of 
hazards (e.g. epidemic diseases, endemic diseases). Moreover, Prattley et al., (2007) and 
Prattley (2009) do not consider stakeholders’ preferences while the developed surveillance-
portfolio analysis framework does. Compared to the single-hazard surveillance analysis 
framework, modelling the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework is more complex because 
it requires combining the outputs of the single-hazard surveillance analysis into the 
surveillance-portfolio optimization model.  This complexity has been vividly demonstrated by 
the numerical example in Chapter 3 and also by the application in Chapter 5.       
 
Although with increased modelling complexity, the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework 
has its importance in finding the optimal resource allocation among a number of resource-
competing hazard surveillance systems. Specifically, the surveillance-portfolio analysis 
framework enables the overall optimal resource allocation (a unique solution) among different 
hazards taking into account the budget constraint faced by a surveillance organization. By 
contrast, the single-hazard analysis framework finds the most preferred surveillance setup by 
the stakeholders among an efficient set of non-dominated solutions (i.e. surveillance setups) 
based on two criteria, i.e., the technical surveillance performance and surveillance costs.  The 
surveillance-portfolio analysis framework also includes the step to obtain an efficient set of 
non-dominated solutions for each hazard using the single-hazard surveillance analysis 
framework. That is why the single-hazard analysis framework is considered the basis of the 
surveillance-portfolio analysis framework. Moreover, since a surveillance portfolio usually 
contains hazards of various types (e.g. epidemic disease, endemic disease, etc.), it is necessary 
to differentiate surveillance objectives for different types of hazards. Chapter 3 distinguishes 
five categories of livestock hazards that can make up a surveillance portfolio into, i.e. zero-
prevalence biological hazards, close-to-zero biological hazards, higher prevalence biological 
hazards, zero-threshold chemical hazards and low-threshold chemical hazards. These hazards 
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are considered to be the most relevant ones in the context of hazard surveillance in livestock 
production chains. For each category, the surveillance objectives, ranging from early 
detection to trend monitoring, are identified. Given the different surveillance objectives, the 
framework for different types of single hazard analysis should be modified to adapt to specific 
hazard features. For example, the first model developed in Chapter 4 is for the epidemic 
disease, classical swine fever (CSF). Since there is no CSF in the country at the beginning of 
the simulation, the framework contains a module that models pathogen introduction. However, 
for the endemic disease e.g., salmonella, the pathogen already exists in the country, and hence, 
the pathogen-introduction module is eliminated from the model. Moreover, since the technical 
surveillance performance indicators for CSF and Salmonella are different (because of 
different surveillance objectives), the modules that compute the technical surveillance 
performances for the two hazards are also different. Hence, the framework is not fully generic 
to allow a homogeneous modelling process. However, although part of the framework should 
be modified to adapt to the specific features of different types of single hazards, the 
framework is generic in the sense that the major modules that mimic the hazard dynamics (the 
three-dimensional population matrix) and surveillance setups (the sampling on the three-
dimensional population matrix) are the same for all hazards. 
 
Compared to the single-hazard analysis framework, the surveillance-portfolio analysis 
framework makes an important theoretical contribution because existing research rarely uses 
the portfolio’s perspective to address the livestock-hazard surveillance problem. Both 
frameworks require intensive data input to setup the single-hazard surveillance simulation and 
surveillance-portfolio analysis models. The required data includes the epidemiological data to 
model the hazard dynamics in the animal population (e.g., the within and between farm 
transmission parameters), the economic and other impact data, and the stakeholder preference 
data. Compared to the single-hazard analysis framework that only targets at a single hazard, 
the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework is more difficult to apply and require more data 
because it deals with multiple hazards. Therefore, one important dimension of the application 
of the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework is to use it as a guideline for surveillance 
decision makers to conduct the surveillance activities. For the single-hazard surveillance 
analysis framework, in case the required data are available (e.g., the classical swine fever case 
study in Chapter 4), detailed quantitative modelling is possible to facilitate the analysis.        
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For the single-hazard surveillance analysis, the framework (Chapter 2) proposes to conduct 
both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis (including stakeholders’ valuation of various 
types of benefits). This is because cost-effectiveness analysis can not quantify the benefits of 
surveillance activities (Häsler, et al., 2011). Following this principle, the application in 
Chapter 4 conducts both a cost-effectiveness analysis and a simplified version of cost-benefit 
analysis without incorporating stakeholders’ preferences. This is because time limitations did 
not allow incorporating more types of benefits and stakeholders’ valuation. Through both 
types of analyses, the efficient set of surveillance setups was identified and a robust 
conclusion was drawn that the current surveillance setup is adequate for classical swine fever 
surveillance (i.e. no more benefits to be gained from an intensified surveillance setup). This 
experience shows that even with the simplified version of cost-benefit analysis, we can still 
draw valuable insights on the single hazard surveillance evaluation. This implies that when 
time and resource are limited, conducting the simplified version of cost-benefit analysis can 
be a good alternative.    
 
The single-hazard surveillance analysis framework (Chapter 2) models the “hazard dynamic” 
and “surveillance activities” into two separate modules. The hazard dynamic module captures 
“what is happening in the animal population”, while the surveillance activities module 
captures “what is the surveillance practitioners looking at”. Using the surveillance activities 
module to sample the animal population in the hazard dynamic module will deliver the 
technical surveillance performances (e.g. duration of the HRP, the herd-level sensitivity, etc.) 
of the surveillance system (i.e. the collection of the surveillance activities). The detailed 
capture of the interactions between the two modules is a distinct feature of the single-hazard 
surveillance analysis framework. Separately modelling the hazard dynamic and surveillance 
activities into two modules is convenient from a modelling point of view. Experience from 
the application study for Dutch CSF surveillance (Chapter 4) shows that with such modelling 
scheme, different surveillance activities (also called surveillance system components) can be 
easily added and abolished from the surveillance system.  
 
Despite the separately modelling scheme, there will still be a big burden for the cost-benefit 
analysis after obtaining the technical surveillance performances and surveillance costs for 
each potential surveillance setup. This holds in particular when the number of potential 
surveillance setups is relatively large. To mitigate the burden of the cost-benefit analysis, the 
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single-hazard surveillance analysis framework (Chapter 2) proposes to use the efficient-set 
based approach to reduce the number of surveillance setups for the followed-up cost-benefit 
analysis. This approach maps all potential surveillance setups in a two dimensional space (i.e. 
the “technical surveillance performance” and “surveillance cost” space), and finds out the 
efficient surveillance setups (i.e. the surveillance setups that are not dominated by others) 
automatically based on the efficiency-set theory. The experience from the application in 
Chapter 4 shows that the majority of the potential surveillance setups are the dominated ones 
and therefore can be excluded from the efficient set, which saves substantial efforts for the 
subsequent cost-benefit analysis.     
 
Another special feature of the proposed single-hazard surveillance analysis framework is the 
use of the “expression-probability matrix” to model the hazard-related expressions in the 
infected animals (Chapter 2). Compared to existing literature (Crauwels et al., 1999; 
Klinkenberg et al.,2005; Backer et al., 2011), the use of the “expression-probability matrix”  
enables a more realistic modelling of the hazard development in the animal population. The 
applications in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show that the “expression-probability matrix” allows 
a detailed mimic of the hazard dynamics in the animal population. The model can point out 
the number of animals on a farm showing a particular kind of hazard-related expressions in a 
specific day. This provides the basis for the surveillance activities module to sample the very 
specific features of the animal population, and therefore makes the sampling procedure more 
realistic. However, the use of the “expression-probability matrix” requires a substantial effort 
in deriving appropriate data. The work includes an extensive literature study to derive the raw 
data (e.g., the data from the experimental infection research) as well as translation of the raw 
data into the format needed to parameterize the model. This data translation usually requires 
the consultation of experts in relevant fields. The applications in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
show that the expert consultation could be quite laborious, especially for the surveillance 
portfolio analysis where multiple experts had to be consulted.   
 
The surveillance-portfolio analysis framework (Chapter 3) intends to solve the overall 
resource allocation problem for the surveillance organizations such as Food Safety 
Authorities. However, the applications show that due to the time and resource limitation, it is 
very hard to consider all hazards surveyed by a surveillance organization at once, and the 
surveillance portfolio should be narrowed down to include a relative small number of hazards 
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that fall in a smaller category. For example, the application in Chapter 5 only takes the 
serological surveillance in a Dutch food company’s slaughterhouses into account (instead of 
all surveillance activities that are conducted by the Dutch food company), which reduces the 
number hazards in the surveillance portfolio problem to five. The surveillance-portfolio 
analysis framework also proposes to first conduct thorough analyses of all single hazards to 
provide basis (inputs) for surveillance portfolio analysis. However, the experience in Chapter 
5 shows that even with a relatively small size, some extent of simplification has to be made 
due to time and data limitations.  
 
In most cases, decisions on hazard surveillance do not only affect the interests of the 
surveillance organization (e.g., the Food Safety Authority) itself, but also the interests of other 
parties (e.g., farmers, citizens). Therefore, the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework 
(Chapter 3) suggests that the analysis should include multiple stakeholders and aim at 
achieving the overall maximum well-being for all stakeholders. However, the complexity of 
the surveillance-portfolio application sometimes requires reducing the multi-stakeholder 
decision problem to a single-stakeholder decision-making problem. The application in 
Chapter 5 showed that the single-stakeholder analysis for hazard surveillance could also be 
appropriate (in terms of providing valuable insights) especially when the surveillance 
organization is private and have a relatively unique interest (e.g., the specific food company’s 
serological surveillance-portfolio case).        
 
Incorporating the stakeholders’ preference to the analysis is a key contribution of the 
proposed frameworks to the literature. The numerical example in Chapter 3 showed that 
preferences can have a big impact on the optimal surveillance portfolio selection.   However, 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that when the hazard impact parameters are highly correlated among 
different HIIs, the results become very robust.  
 
6.3 Policy Implications  
The policy implications of this PhD dissertation are at two levels, i.e. the conceptual level and 
the application level. The conceptual level implications are derived from Chapter 2 and 3, 
which proposed two conceptual frameworks respectively for single-hazard surveillance 
analysis and surveillance portfolio optimization. These frameworks have generalized the 
relevant aspects of economic analysis of livestock hazard surveillance for both single hazard 
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and multiple-hazard portfolio. They provide new insights for surveillance practitioners and 
decision makers towards livestock hazard surveillance (i.e. look at livestock hazard 
surveillance in a holistic way). When the surveillance decision makers make decisions on 
surveillance resource allocation, the frameworks can serve as a conceptual guideline to 
indicate what relevant issues should be considered and what procedure should be followed. 
For example, both frameworks emphasize the importance of considering the asymmetric 
distribution of surveillance costs and benefits among stakeholders. Hence, a thorough 
stakeholder analysis should be conducted considering all parties’ interests, before any 
decision is made. Moreover, both frameworks are decomposed into several detailed steps 
which can be easily followed by the decision maker.    
 
At the application level, the single-hazard surveillance analysis framework (Chapter 2) 
includes a surveillance simulation model successfully capturing the interactions between the 
detailed hazard dynamics and the surveillance activities. The core of the surveillance 
simulation model, the hazard expression-probability matrix, enables to model the hazard 
dynamics in three dimensions. Using the hazard expression-probability matrix allows the 
model to better mimic the hazard development and capture the real-life situation that provides 
information with improved quality for decision support. However, to construct the 
expression-probability matrix, extensive epidemiological data are required, and therefore it 
requires the surveillance organization (e.g. food safety authorities, food companies) to invest 
in data collection research (e.g., experimental infection research).  
 
By applying the proposed surveillance analysis frameworks, the research of two application 
studies has drawn fruitful managerial insights to help the surveillance decision makers 
improve surveillance performance in the livestock production chains. Several managerial 
implications for Dutch CSF surveillance were drawn from the analysis of Chapter 4. Firstly, 
the finding that there is no economic benefit to be gained by intensifying the current 
surveillance activities provides the justification for Dutch FSA to retain the current CSF 
surveillance system. Only when there is a significant increase of the risk of CSF introduction 
(e.g. outbreaks in neighbourhood countries), more intensified surveillance setups should be 
considered.  Secondly, the finding that the efficient sets of surveillance setups are different for 
the moderately and low virulent CSF implies decision makers should treat the surveillance of 
the two virulence strains differently. Specifically, for the moderate virulent CSF, when it is 
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necessary to intensify the surveillance, the decision maker should consider to apply PCR tests 
on rendered animals. Differently, for the low-virulent CSF, the decision maker should 
consider to add more serological tests as the risk of low virulent CSF introduction increases. 
Thirdly, the fact that serological surveillance is effective for early detection of low virulent 
CSF provides the opportunity for FSAs to consider applying the serology-related surveillance 
system components in the area where the risk of low virulent CSF introduction is high. 
Fourthly, the results of the surveillance-portfolio framework application (Chapter 5) show that 
there is a clear gap between the currently applied surveillance portfolio by the Dutch food 
company and the optimal surveillance portfolio, which implies a good opportunity for either 
improved surveillance performance or reduced surveillance costs. This finding suggests that 
surveillance decision makers should use a surveillance portfolio perspective instead of 
applying protocols previously based on a single hazard. Finally, the surveillance organizations 
should make trade-offs between investing more in livestock hazard surveillance research or in 
intensifying the current livestock hazard surveillance systems. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6.4 Future Research  
Future research can either focus on improving the developed conceptual frameworks (i.e. 
make theoretical modifications of the frameworks) or improving the practicability of the 
proposed frameworks (i.e. make the frameworks easier for practical use). The latter deserves 
more attention because the basic principles of surveillance have been comparably well 
addressed in the conceptual frameworks, whereas the application of these frameworks 
remains a big limitation. Since, the ultimate goal of developing any conceptual approach 
should be towards real application, research priority needs to be given to solving the data 
limitation problem, which is the biggest barrier for framework applications.  
 
Data limitations have been extensively discussed for the application of the single hazard 
analysis framework (Chapter 2) and surveillance-portfolio analysis framework (Chapter 3), 
and is the prime obstacle to application of the proposed frameworks. For the two applications 
in Chapter 4 and 5, expert elicitation methods had to be used due to lack of directly usable 
data. The data required by the proposed frameworks can be classified into two categories, i.e. 
the hard data and preference data. The hard data include the data for parameterizing the 
hazard simulation model (such as the disease transmission parameters and the data for 
constructing the hazard expression-probability matrix) and the hazard impact simulation 
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model (e.g., Hop et al, 2014). Such data are available for some well-studied hazards, like CSF, 
avian influenza (AI), and foot and mouth disease (FMD). However, the well-studied hazards 
only account for a small proportion of total livestock hazards. The preference data refer to the 
elicited stakeholder preferences to various types of mitigated hazard impacts (or benefits from 
surveillance). The difficulty in obtaining such data is that the preferences of the stakeholders 
towards the mitigated hazard impacts could be different when he or she is in different states 
(e.g., Karni, 1987; Melino and Yang, 2003). This requires setting up a stakeholder panel to 
regularly recalculate the optimal surveillance portfolio to account for the possible changed 
stakeholder’s preferences. Apparently, this process is laborious and may have limited 
applicability in practice. Moreover, in some cases, the stakeholders may not want to show 
their real preferences to others due to strategic reasons. This will bias the multi-criteria 
decision making model. In other words, both the hard and preference data availability restricts 
the application of the proposed conceptual frameworks.  
 
Given the data limitation, the single hazard and surveillance portfolio frameworks should be 
used in a different way. For the single-hazard framework application, especially for the well-
studied hazards, it is relatively easy to find the required data. Hence, it can be used in a 
quantitative way for decision support. For the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework, 
since it requires a large amount of data, it should be used more carefully as a decision support 
tool. To improve the data availability, firstly, more bio-epidemiological studies (including 
experimental and statistical studies) need to be conducted for the little-known livestock 
hazards to provide the hard data, such as disease transmission parameters and disease 
symptom occurrence probabilities, for developing the disease simulation model.   Secondly, 
since there are various data sources in literature which often provide inconsistent information, 
meta-analyses should be carried out to contrast and combine results from different studies. As 
such, the analysis will then rely less on expert opinions to confirm the values of model 
parameters, and therefore increase the objectivity of model parameterization. 
 
Another limitation of this research is that to focus on elaborating the main objective of this 
dissertation, i.e. addressing economics of hazard surveillance in livestock production chains, I 
took the intervention strategy as given to allow for investigating the effects of surveillance 
only. This assumption implies that the possible effects of intervention on hazard impact 
mitigations are neglected when comparing different surveillance scenarios. It is pointed by 
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Häsler et al., (2011) and Howe et al. (2013) that the mitigated impacts caused by the hazard 
do not only depend on the quality of surveillance but also the quality of intervention. In other 
words, surveillance and intervention should be considered simultaneously. However, as 
shown by the research in this dissertation, only addressing the aspects of surveillance itself 
(by assuming a fixed default intervention strategy) has already made the study very 
complicated; investigating the joint effects of surveillance and intervention is an interesting 
avenue for future research.  
 
The case study in Chapter 5 only considered a single stakeholder surveillance portfolio (i.e. 
the Dutch food company is the only stakeholder) due to the time limitation. Because livestock 
hazard surveillance actually has the impacts on multiple parties’ interests (e.g., farmers, 
consumers, citizens, and animal welfare protection groups), future research can optimize 
surveillance activities applying a multi-stakeholder perspective, aiming to achieve societal 
welfare maximization. Also because of the time limitation, the case study in Chapter 5 only 
used four hazard impact indicators (HIIs), which were suggested by the surveillance managers 
in the Dutch food company, to evaluate the surveillance performance for the pig-hazard 
surveillance portfolio. In future research, a more extensive list of hazard impact indicators 
(reflecting different types of benefits) could be used to facilitate a more complete evaluation 
of livestock hazard surveillance. Furthermore, the surveillance-portfolio optimization model 
did not take into account the uncertainty of the hazard impact parameters for each investigated 
surveillance portfolios. Instead, we conduct sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the 
results. Future research should focus on finding a way to incorporate the uncertainty of the 
hazard impact parameters into the model.  
 
In additions, the conceptual frameworks are developed to analyze hazard surveillance for 
different species of animals. However, due to the time limitation, both application studies are 
applied to pig hazards. Future research should try to extend the application of the frameworks 
to hazards of other animal species (e.g., chicken, cows).  
 
Moreover, since this research focuses on addressing the livestock-hazard surveillance 
problem in the Netherlands, the conceptual frameworks were only adapted to fit the Dutch 
situation. However, since the frameworks are generic and can also be applied to other 
countries. 
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Finally yet importantly, part of the conceptual frameworks may also be applied to evaluate 
surveillance systems in other fields, e.g., surveillance of the plant diseases, surveillance of 
cargos and surveillance of crimes.     
 
6.5 Main conclusions  
The main conclusions derived from the dissertation are: 
· The single hazard analysis conceptual framework improves the understanding of livestock 
hazard surveillance on the single hazard level and it has a relatively good applicability 
because it requires relatively few data for the application (Chapter 2).    
· The surveillance-portfolio analysis conceptual framework improves the understanding of 
livestock hazard surveillance to a surveillance portfolio level but it requires more data for 
real application, compared to the single hazard analysis (Chapter 3).    
· Adding serological surveillance to the current Dutch CSF surveillance system is ineffective 
for detecting the moderate virulence CSF but effective for low virulent CSF detection 
(Chapter 4). 
· Adding the PCR testing on rendered animals to the current Dutch CSF surveillance system 
is effective for moderate virulence CSF detection but ineffective for detecting low 
virulence CSF (Chapter 4).    
· The current Dutch CSF surveillance system is adequate and there is little to be gained 
economically by implementing more intensified surveillance setups (Chapter 4).  
· The Dutch food company can improve the performance of its current surveillance portfolio 
by better allocating its surveillance resource or can reduce its annual surveillance costs but 
still maintain the same level of surveillance performance (Chapter 5).  
· Surveillance in livestock production chains by the Dutch food company should be 
addressed from a portfolio perspective, instead of a single hazard, because addressing 
single hazard surveillance separately could result in sub-optimal surveillance resource 
allocation. (Chapter 5)    
· The results of the pig-hazard surveillance portfolio optimization are robust with respect to 
the changes of stakeholder’s weights to hazard impact indicators (HIIs) due to the high 
correlations of impact scores among the HIIs (Chapter 5).    
· Relaxing legal constraints for livestock hazard surveillance could improve the overall 
surveillance portfolio performance (Chapter 5).    
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Summary 
Hazard surveillance in livestock production chains is an essential activity that is usually 
conducted by surveillance organizations. Its importance has been highlighted by the major 
crises that occurred in the field of livestock production and food safety during the last decades. 
Examples include Classical Swine Fever (CSF) during the 1990s in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Germany, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the 1990s in the United 
Kingdom, recent Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in China, and Foot and Mouth 
disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and South Korea in 2001 and 2010 respectively. Such 
crises resulted also in reduced public confidence in food production and products.  
 
Although extensive research has been conducted to achieve surveillance improvement in 
livestock production chains, they have limitations in terms of coverage of economic aspects 
and in the level of detail in modelling the interactions between hazard dynamics and 
surveillance activities. Hence, the dissertation aims to (1) improve the understanding of 
hazard surveillance in livestock production chains from an economic perspective, and (2) to 
apply the obtained knowledge for better model-based in-depth analysis of livestock hazard 
surveillance. This overall objective was addressed in four research chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework for the economic analysis of single-hazard 
surveillance systems in livestock production chains which differs from most of the previous 
research focusing on the technical aspect of livestock hazard surveillance. This single-hazard 
analysis conceptual framework includes objective and subjective aspects of single-hazard 
surveillance system analysis. The objective analysis is a simulation model aimed at deriving 
an efficient set of surveillance setups based on the technical surveillance performance 
parameters and the corresponding surveillance costs, and the subjective analysis is a multi-
criteria decision making model to evaluate the impacts of the hazard surveillance. This 
chapter also discusses the scientific validity of the conceptual framework and the availability 
of data in the framework’s application. We conclude that that the conceptual approach is 
scientifically credible for economic analysis of single-hazard surveillance systems and that 
the applicability of the approach critically depends on data availability.    
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Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework for the economic optimization of a surveillance- 
portfolio consisting of multiple livestock hazards to survey. This framework applies the 
portfolio perspective to investigate the surveillance resource allocation problem, which is 
beyond the state of art that mainly focuses on single hazard surveillance analyses. A multi-
criteria surveillance-portfolio optimization model is proposed which uses the outputs of the 
single hazard surveillance analysis as inputs. This chapter also discusses the scientific and 
data validity of the conceptual approach, as well as its practical use.        
 
Chapter 4 applies the single-hazard surveillance framework to conduct a comprehensive 
economic analysis of CSF surveillance in the Netherlands. It takes into account the 
specialized structure of Dutch pig production, differences in virulence of CSF strains, and a 
complete list of possible surveillance activities. This chapter uses the current Dutch CSF 
surveillance system (i.e. the default surveillance setup) as the starting point, and investigates a 
number of alternative surveillance setups using cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses. 
Managerial insights are provided that can facilitate the decision making of policy makers.  
The results of the cost-effectiveness analysis show that the alternative surveillance setups with 
“PCR on rendered animals” are effective for the moderately virulent CSF strain, whereas the 
surveillance setups with “routine serology in slaughterhouses” or “routine serology on sow 
farms” are effective for the low virulent strain. Moreover, the current CSF surveillance 
system in the Netherlands is cost-effective for both moderately virulent and low virulent CSF 
strains. The results of the cost-benefit analysis for the moderately virulent CSF strain indicate 
that the current surveillance system in the Netherlands is adequate. From an economic 
perspective, there is little to be gained from intensifying surveillance.     
 
Chapter 5 applies the surveillance-portfolio analysis framework to conduct economic 
optimization of a pig-hazard surveillance-portfolio, consisting of five pig-related hazards, in a 
Dutch food company. In this chapter, each hazard is first analyzed using the single hazard 
surveillance analysis model to derive the technical surveillance performances and annual 
surveillance costs for each investigated surveillance setup. Then, the impact parameters 
corresponding to certain technical surveillance performance are estimated by experts. 
Together with the elicited stakeholder’s weights, the surveillance portfolio optimization 
model is parameterized. Managerial implications are derived from the model’s results to help 
the company improve its surveillance portfolio’s performance. The first conclusion we can 
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draw from this chapter is that surveillance organizations should need to use a portfolio 
perspective to guide their surveillance resource allocation. This is because the case clearly 
shows that arbitrarily allocating surveillance costs can cause efficiency losses (either in terms 
of higher surveillance costs or low SP performance). Furthermore, eliminating legal 
constraints for some hazards in a SP may result in higher SP performance. Finally, when 
correlations of impact parameters between HIIs implies are high, results are robust to 
stakeholder’s preferences regarding HIIs.      
 
Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of different chapters and discusses the findings in the 
perspective of the existing literature. It also discusses the implications for future research and 
the efforts required for further implementing the conceptual frameworks for single hazard 
surveillance and surveillance portfolio optimization. The main conclusions drawn from this 
PhD dissertation are: 
· The single hazard analysis conceptual framework improves the understanding of livestock 
hazard surveillance on the single hazard level and it has a relatively good applicability 
because it requires relatively few data for the application (Chapter 2).    
· The surveillance-portfolio analysis conceptual framework improves the understanding of 
livestock hazard surveillance to a surveillance portfolio level but it requires more data for 
real application, compared to the single hazard analysis (Chapter 3).    
· Adding serological surveillance to the current Dutch CSF surveillance system is ineffective 
for detecting the moderate virulence CSF but effective for low virulent CSF detection 
(Chapter 4). 
· Adding the PCR testing on rendered animals to the current Dutch CSF surveillance system 
is effective for moderate virulence CSF detection but ineffective for detecting low 
virulence CSF (Chapter 4).    
· The current Dutch CSF surveillance system is adequate and there is little to be gained 
economically by implementing more intensified surveillance setups (Chapter 4).  
· The Dutch food company can improve the performance of its current surveillance portfolio 
by better allocating its surveillance resource or can reduce its annual surveillance costs but 
still maintain the same level of surveillance performance (Chapter 5).  
· Surveillance in livestock production chains by the Dutch food company should be 
addressed from a portfolio perspective, instead of a single hazard, because addressing 
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single hazard surveillance separately could result in sub-optimal surveillance resource 
allocation. (Chapter 5)    
· The results of the pig-hazard surveillance portfolio optimization are robust with respect to 
the changes of stakeholder’s weights to hazard impact indicators (HIIs) due to the high 
correlations of impact scores among the HIIs (Chapter 5).    
· Relaxing legal constraints for livestock hazard surveillance could improve the overall 
surveillance portfolio performance (Chapter 5).    
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Samenvatting 
“Hazard surveillance” in dierlijke productie ketens is een essentiële activiteit die meestal door 
toezichthoudende organisaties wordt uitgevoerd. Het belang van toezicht wordt benadrukt 
door de grote crises die de laatste decennia hebben plaatsgevonden in de veehouderij alsmede 
met betrekking tot de voedselveiligheid. Voorbeelden zijn de uitbraken van klassieke 
varkenspest (KVP) in 1990 in Nederland, België en Duitsland, boviene spongiforme 
encefalopathie (BSE) in 1990 in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en meer recent aviaire influenza 
(HPAI) in China, en mond- en klauwzeer (MKZ) in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zuid-Korea. 
Dergelijke crises resulteerden ook in een verminderd publiek vertrouwen in de 
voedselproductie. 
 
Ofschoon uitgebreid onderzoek is uitgevoerd naar het verbeteren van het toezicht op dierlijke 
productieketens, is er nog relatief weinig aandacht besteed aan de economische aspecten en 
een meer gedetailleerde modellering van risico (“hazard”) en bewakingsactiviteiten. Vandaar 
dat dit proefschrift gericht is op (1) het verbeteren van het inzicht in “Hazard surveillance” in 
dierlijke productie ketens vanuit een economisch perspectief, en (2) om de verworven kennis 
toe te passen ten einde model gebaseerde analyses in dierlijke productie ketens te verbeteren. 
Deze algemene doelstelling is aangepakt in een viertal  hoofdstukken. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een conceptueel raamwerk voor de economische analyse van “single-
hazard” bewakingssystemen in veehouderijketens gepresenteerd. Dit raamwerk verschilt 
aanzienlijk van bestaande studies. Tot nu toe is het onderzoek vooral gericht op technische 
aspecten van “Hazard surveillance” in de veehouderij. Het conceptuele kader voor “single-
hazard surveillance” omvat daarentegen zowel objectieve als subjectieve aspecten van 
“single-hazard” detectie analyse. De objectieve analyse is via een simulatiemodel 
vormgegeven en is gericht op het afleiden van een efficiënte verzameling van toezicht setups 
op basis van technische prestatie parameters en de bijbehorende kosten voor bewaking. De 
subjectieve analyse omvat een multi-criteria besluitvormingsmodel om de gevolgen van 
“Hazard surveillance” te evalueren. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt ook de wetenschappelijke 
validiteit van het conceptuele raamwerk alsmede de beschikbaarheid van gegevens. We 
concluderen dat de conceptuele benadering bruikbaar is voor de economische analyse van 
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single-hazard bewakingssystemen en dat de toepassing van de aanpak sterk afhankelijk is van 
beschikbare data. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert een conceptueel raamwerk voor de inspectie en voor de economische 
optimalisatie van een surveillanceportfolio die meerdere risico factoren omvat. In 
tegenstelling tot de gangbare praktijk van inspectie gaat het raamwerk niet uit van een “single 
hazard” benadering, i.e. een enkelvoudig risico, maar juist van meerdere risico’s.  Het 
ontwikkelde conceptuele raamwerk beoogt een optimale toewijzing van beperkt beschikbare 
middelen te realiseren voor de simultane inspectie van meerdere risico’s. Dit hoofdstuk stelt 
een multi-criteria surveillance-portfolio optimalisatie model voor waarbij de inspectie op 
enkelvoudige risico analyse als input is gebruikt. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt zowel de 
wetenschappelijke validiteit, de validiteit van data als de toepassing van het concept in de 
praktijk. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt het ontwikkelde “single hazard” toezichtskader uit hoofdstuk 2 als 
uitgangspunt genomen voor de toepassing van een uitgebreide economische analyse voor CSF 
(varkenspest) in Nederland. De toepassing houdt rekening met de specifieke structuur van de 
Nederlandse varkenshouderij, de verschillen in virulentie van CSF stammen en een volledige 
lijst van mogelijke bewakingsactiviteiten. Dit hoofdstuk neemt het huidige Nederlandse CSF 
bewakingssysteem (d.w.z de standaard surveillance setup) als uitgangspunt en maakt een 
kosten effectiviteit en kosten baten analyse van een aantal alternatieve surveillance setups. 
Management inzichten worden gepresenteerd die besluitvormingsprocessen door 
beleidsmakers kunnen ondersteunen. Uit de resultaten van de kosten-batenanalyse blijkt dat 
alternatieve surveillance setups met "PCR testen op destructiebedrijven" effectief zijn voor 
matig virulente CSF stammen, terwijl surveillance setups met een "routine serologie in 
slachthuizen" of "routine serologie op zeugenbedrijven" effectief zijn voor laag virulente 
stammen. Bovendien blijkt het huidige CSF surveillance systeem in Nederland  
kosteneffectief te zijn voor zowel matig virulente als laag virulente CSF stammen. De 
resultaten van de kosten-baten analyse voor matig virulente CSF stammen geven aan dat het 
huidige bewakingssysteem in Nederland volstaat. Vanuit een economisch perspectief gezien 
is weinig toegevoegde waarde te behalen met het intensiveren van toezicht. 
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In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het ontwikkelde conceptuele raamwerk voor surveillanceportfolio 
toegepast. De doelstelling is om de economische optimalisatie van een detectiesysteem voor 
een vijftal risico’s (hazards) in de varkenshouderij te analyseren voor een Nederlands 
voedingsbedrijf. In dit hoofdstuk wordt elk risico in eerste instantie geanalyseerd met behulp 
van het enkelvoudige (i.e. “single hazard”) surveillance model om zowel de technische 
prestaties als de jaarlijkse kosten van het toezicht voor elke setup af te leiden. Vervolgens zijn 
de noodzakelijke parameters die overeenkomen met bepaalde technische prestaties door 
experts ingeschat. Tezamen met de geëliciteerde gewichten van diverse belanghebbenden is 
het surveillanceportfolio model geparametriseerd. Met behulp van het model zijn effecten en 
resultaten afgeleid die het management binnen het bedrijf kunnen ondersteunen om de 
surveillance portfolio’s te verbeteren. De eerste conclusie die we kunnen trekken uit dit 
hoofdstuk is dat het toezichthoudende organisaties een portfolio benadering dienen te 
hanteren om de toewijzing van beperkt beschikbare middelen voor de surveillance van 
risico’s te begeleiden. De case studie laat duidelijk zien dat het willekeurig toerekenen van 
kosten voor surveillance een reductie van de efficiëntie kunnen veroorzaken (hetzij in termen 
van hogere kosten voor bewaking danwel van lagere SP prestaties). Bovendien blijkt dat het 
elimineren van wettelijke beperkingen voor sommige risico’s tot hogere SP prestaties kan 
leiden. Ten slotte blijkt dat de resultaten voor de preferenties van belanghebbenden robuust 
zijn met betrekking tot de HII’s als de correlaties van parameters tussen HII’s hoog zijn. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert een synthese van de verschillende hoofdstukken en bespreekt de 
bevindingen in het perspectief van de bestaande literatuur. Ook wordt ingegaan op de 
implicaties voor toekomstig onderzoek en de inspanningen die nodig zijn voor verdere 
ontwikkeling van de ontwikkelde conceptuele raamwerken voor zowel enkelvoudige risico 
surveillance als voor de portfolio benadering. De belangrijkste conclusies van dit proefschrift 
zijn: 
• Het ontwikkelde conceptuele raamwerk voor de economische analyse van “single-hazard” 
bewakingssystemen verbetert het inzicht voor surveillance van enkelvoudige surveillance in 
dierlijke productie ketens. Het raamwerk is relatief goed toepasbaar omdat relatief weinig 
gegevens vereist zijn (hoofdstuk 2). 
• Het ontwikkelde raamwerk voor surveillance-portfolio-analyse verbetert het inzicht voor 
surveillance op portfolio niveau maar de aanpak vereist beduidend meer gegevens voor 
toepassing in de praktijk ten opzichte van analyses op “single-hazard” niveau (hoofdstuk 3). 
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• Het toevoegen van serologische surveillance aan het huidige Nederlandse CSF surveillance 
systeem is niet effectief voor het detecteren van matig virulente CSF stammen maar wel 
effectief voor laag virulente CSF detectie (hoofdstuk 4). 
• De PCR-test op destructiebedrijven toevoegen aan het huidige Nederlandse CSF 
surveillance systeem is effectief voor matige virulente CSF detectie, maar niet effectief voor 
het opsporen van laag virulente CSF stammen (hoofdstuk 4). 
• Het huidige Nederlandse CSF surveillance systeem is voldoende en er is, economisch gezien, 
weinig meerwaarde te realiseren via het intensiveren van toezicht (i.e. via alternatieve setups) 
(hoofdstuk 4). 
• Het Nederlandse voedingsbedrijf kan de uitvoering van de huidige surveillance portfolio 
verbeteren middels een betere toewijzing van de beschikbare middelen of het kan de jaarlijkse 
kosten voor toezicht reduceren waarbij het niveau van de surveillance prestaties gelijk blijft 
(hoofdstuk 5). 
• Toezicht in dierlijke productieketens door het Nederlandse voedingsbedrijf moet vanuit een 
portfolio perspectief worden benaderd omdat de aanpak via enkelvoudige risico detectie tot 
een sub-optimale toewijzing van de beschikbare middelen kan leiden. (Hoofdstuk 5) 
• De resultaten van het risicodetectiesysteem voor de varkenshouderij zijn robuust met 
betrekking tot veranderingen van de gewichten door stakeholders voor HII’s (Hazard Impact 
Indicators) gezien de hoge correlaties van parameters tussen HII’s (hoofdstuk 5). 
• Het reduceren van de wettelijke eisen voor risicodetectiesystemen kan de prestatie van de 
totale surveillance portfolio verbeteren (hoofdstuk 5). 
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